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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The increasing dependence on computer networks in both the civilian and military 
communities have caused these networks to become enticing targets for information 
warriors. The existing techniques for dealing with attacks --Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), and anomalous network monitors-- all have 
weaknesses, such as generation of false alarms, resource exhaustion, and an inability to 
perform efficiently in the presence of high network traffic loads. One way to address 
these weaknesses is to reduce the workload on a given IDS without sacrificing the ability 
to accurately identify attacks. With a reduction in traffic being analyzed by any one IDS 
or IPS, the impact of many of the aforementioned weaknesses will, in theory, be reduced.  
To limit the traffic flowing into a computing system, a new device called a stream 
splitter was conceived. This device processes network traffic as a collection of directed 
connections. Each connection is then analyzed by a series of sensors inside the stream 
splitter and associated with a stream. Each stream is sent to an IDS for analysis, allowing 
for each IDS to be configured to analyze a specific type of traffic.  
This thesis details the building of a multi-threaded extendable architecture, called 
a stream splitter, for implementing a traffic separation scheme on a network. The stream 
splitter was tested for the ability to capture network traffic efficiently and also for the 
ability to separate network streams from the captured network traffic. The stream splitter 
is able to efficiently capture network traffic at speeds up to 30Mb/s; at higher network 
speeds capture engine packet loss becomes excessive. The stream splitter, through the use 
of a generic switch, is able to route streams to their intended destination by using the 
media access control (MAC) address of the destination interface. The stream splitter is 
also able to dynamically adjust the traffic separation scheme at runtime through the 
addition of a new stream isolation sensor to the stream splitter architecture. The stream 
splitter allows a network administrator to control the type of data that is sent to each IDS 



























A.  BACKGROUND 
In general there are two types of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), signature and 
anomaly-based systems. A signature-based IDS relies on a database of known attacks 
with which to compare network traffic in an effort to determine if an attack is in progress. 
Anomaly-based IDS’s rely on the ability to determine what characterizes normal traffic 
and compare sensed network traffic to what is expected. There are several challenges 
associated with improving the performance and capabilities of both types of intrusion 
detection systems. One of the challenges identified in the results of the study reported in 
[2] is to reduce the number of false alarms generated by such systems, thereby relieving 
system administrators and other personnel from expending resources to respond to false 
alarms.  
One possibility for addressing the aforementioned challenge is to apply a type of 
filtering termed “IDS stream splitting,” which consists of classifying each packet as a 
member of a stream when it is encountered between the sniffer and the IDS. To do this 
network traffic is viewed as a collection of connections. For the purpose of this thesis a 
connection is a data path between a system on the outside of the network to be protected 
and a system inside the network. A connection can be characterized by the source IP 
address, the destination IP address, and the service that is in use. Each packet can then be 
associated with either an existing active connection, or a new Never-Before-Seen (NBS) 
connection. This classification allows for the stream of network traffic to be split up into 
sub-streams based on type of service(i.e. web, e-mail, ftp, etc...) or some other defined 
metric. 
The results of a study published in Network World indicate that the traffic on a 
production-level network caused many IDS’s to fail [5]. These systems consume all 
available resources with logging processes or false alarms. By using a stream splitter to 
reduce the amount of traffic going to each IDS, the amount of total network traffic that 
can be inspected prior to a system collapse would increase. In the worst case, all traffic 
would be of the same type and as such would be sent to a single IDS. If the splitter can 
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distribute the traffic to any extent, all other things being equal, system up-time should in 
theory be as good or better than that of the single-channel approach. In other words, the 
single channel introduces a choke point, whereas the splitter can reduce the amount of 
traffic that has to pass through the choke point.  
The overall detection scheme could be implemented using primarily Commercial 
Of The Shelf (COTS) technology, with the exception of the implementation for the 
splitter; this is in line with the Department of the Navy’s acquisition policy of acquiring 
information systems by integrating reusable components, especially COTS products. 
B. RELATED EFFORTS 
In [7] previous efforts to reduce the false alarm rates of IDS are listed; this list 
includes placing the IDS behind a firewall, tuning the signatures used for detection, and 
using network analysis to filter out false alarms from the alarms that are generated. 
Placing the IDS behind a firewall is one of the easiest reduction techniques to implement. 
Performing network analysis on generated alarms is both time consuming and requires a 
detailed understanding of the network that is to be protected. The effect of using a stream 
splitter is similar to that produced by placing a firewall between the IDS and the network 
stream, albeit an intelligent firewall. However, a major difference between a firewall and 
our splitter is that no traffic will be dropped:  it can only be diverted. 
The results of the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation performed by 
Lincoln Laboratory at MIT brought to light some of the problems that plague modern 
IDS [2]. The signature-based IDS tested were able to alert the operator for a number of 
the data set attacks. Unfortunately, both recognizing these attacks in the presence of 
heavy network-traffic loads, or recognizing a legitimate alarm amongst a sea of false 
alarms remains a challenge. We hypothesize that by using a stream splitter the 
performance of a COTS IDS can be improved. The “black box” nature of the stream 
splitter allows for ease of deployment in a wide range of detection schemes. Through the 
use of a stream splitter, it is likely that operators will be able to more easily detect attacks 
on high traffic networks and also see a reduction in the number of false alarms due to 
both the reduction in traffic and the ability to more finely tune their existing IDS to the 
correct type of traffic each IDS is monitoring.  
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C. STREAM SPLITTER OVERVIEW 
In our daily lives we constantly break information up into categories. An anomaly 
in one category is normal in another. A formula-1 race car next to you on the freeway is 
an anomaly, as is a school bus on a formula-1 race track. If the two were switched they 
would fit in with what was expected, be in the correct context and no longer be 
anomalies. As humans we are constantly interpreting what we see in our daily lives in 
terms of the context that we obtain the information. The splitter is able to separate 
network traffic into streams of information that contain similar data. This allows network 
traffic to be analyzed according to what type of traffic it is.  
The splitter operates through the use of sensors. Each sensor is given full network 
traffic. There are two types of sensors, active and passive sensors. Active sensors must 
examine a packet and then communicate the results of the examination back to a sensor 
control structure where as passive sensors simply receive traffic and act on the 
information unilaterally.  
The use of these two types of sensors allows for the splitter to act as a stream 
isolator or assign a trust level to packets and route a packet based on its trust, or as a 
combination of the two. In order to route packets based on trust, the splitter examines 
each packet as part of a connection and assigns a trust ranking to it from the range [0..1] 
using a fuzzy logic model. Fuzzy logic (see, for example, [6] for a primer on this subject) 
has been chosen due to the ability to partially associate an object with a set of objects. In 
[7], fuzzy set theory was used to determine the confidence of the system that an event had 
been correctly classified. For network intrusion detection the issue becomes one of how 
trustworthy or un-trustworthy the traffic is. To be successful each packet must be 
assigned a trust level. The trust level will be based on the type of connection and the 
number of times the connection has been seen in a given time window. If no operator 
action is taken, then over time as the connection is seen more often, the connection will 
be assigned ever increasing levels of trust until it is no longer sent to the IDS evaluating 
un-trusted traffic.  All NBS connection traffic is viewed as suspicious. Traffic not sent to 
the un-trusted traffic IDS will be sent to a trusted-traffic IDS to ensure that all network 
traffic is continuously monitored.  
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When the splitter is acting as a stream isolator all traffic is sent to a sensor for 
isolation. If the traffic matches what the sensor is isolating then further analysis is done. 
If the traffic does not match then it is simply ignored by the sensor. In this way multiple 
sensors can be employed to look at the same data and only those sensor that find the data 
useful will act on it. Isolators route traffic themselves so there is no additional 
information that must be communicated back to the sensor control structure.  
The idea for investigating the technical feasibility of using splitters is founded on 
the principles of Huffman coding[1]. The fewer the number of times a specific pattern is 
detected, be it a connection type or a specific connection, the more information is present 
simply by the existence of that item. For example a mail server that connects to a network 
every day to deliver mail is not as suspicious as a NBS connection using telnet. 
Consequently, traffic associated with this mail server can be directly forwarded. There 
are COTS products that will examine e-mail so there is no need to examine the same 
traffic with an IDS at the network level. 
A stream splitter also allows for a detection scheme to grow. For instance a more 
comprehensive network monitoring system could be built with the addition of an 
anomaly detection system. This would provide a network anomaly detection capability in 
addition to the ability to monitor network traffic for attack signatures. 
D. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
COTS routers can split traffic based on service or destination but the stream 
splitter can also route traffic based on the number of times the connection has been seen 
or a number of other metrics. That is the splitter acts essentially like an intelligent router. 
This allows for the use of an IDS tailored for a specific subset of network traffic. This 
ability to split based on a number of metrics allows for the use of a number of COTS 
IDS. This reduces the cost of deployment of the system and allows for a detection scheme 
to grow over time so that as new hardware is added to the system, the additions may be 
more effectively used.  
The specific objective of this thesis is to develop an extensible architecture for 
network stream splitting and design a functional prototype. This prototype is evaluated 
for functional accuracy and performance. 
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If the number of false alarms can be reduced without sacrificing accuracy then 
network operators can be more efficient in discovering attacks on their networks. This 
increase in efficiency will result in a reduction in the number of personnel required to 
monitor a network. This will lead to a reduction in the cost of operation for the 
Department of the Navy without a drop in the level of protection for naval computer 
networks. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized such that chapter two explains the high level design of the 
stream splitter and design considerations. Emphasis is placed on why design decisions 
were made and other options that were available.  
Chapter three talks of the implementation of the stream splitter and how each of 
the major components were coded. Differences between the C++ and Objective-C 
implementations are emphasized. Data type decisions are also detailed in this chapter. 
Each of the sensors that was developed as well as splitter specific storage types  
are discussed in chapter four. Many of the sensors were ported from C++ to Objective-C 
with minor modification. Differences in the sensors between the two implementations are 
discussed as well. 
Testing of the splitter is covered in chapter five. Both implementations of the 
splitter were tested for capture efficiency and compared with Snort. Once the prototype is 
shown to be able to capture traffic, a traffic separation scheme is correctly demonstrated 
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II. THE STREAM SPLITTING PARADIGM 
A. STREAMS  
A router takes a network stream as an input and then splits the stream by routing 
packets in different directions according to where the packet is ultimately destined. The 
result of this is that through the use of a stream splitting mechanism, overall system 
performance is increased. Every computer on the Internet has no need to see the traffic of 
every other computer on the Internet. Indeed if this was so, nothing would get 
accomplished as the system would be in a constant state of saturation. The split in effect 
makes the existence of such a massive system possible.  
In the context of a computer network, traffic can be split into streams by a number 
of different metrics. The split could be based on source, destination, type of service, 
protocol, or many other factors. The ability to split a traffic stream into sub-streams 
makes the problem of traffic analysis more manageable.  
Information can be categorized and through this categorization the information 
becomes more valuable. Once the information can be placed in some sort of context it 
becomes easier to use. For the stream splitter, each connection is viewed as a category. A 
packet then belongs to a connection and through this association additional information 
can be assumed about the packet.  
It is this additional information that the stream splitter focuses on, whether doing 
fuzzy classification or stream isolation, this is what separates the stream splitter from a 
router. Current routers will not make a judgement as to the trustworthiness of the packets 
it is routing. The stream isolators apart from doing standard router splitting can also split 
traffic based on how often the connection has been seen. In this way a low data rate 
infrequent connection can be separated out from the main network stream and undergo a 
more rigorous evaluation. This ability to single out slow, infrequent connections, such as 
a stealth scan, distinguishes the stream splitter from other network analysis tools.   
B. HIGH LEVEL DESIGN   
To get the desired level of performance, a multi-threaded design was necessary. In 
general there are three parts to the system. Each part is given its own thread of execution. 
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• The Packet Capture Engine 
• The Packet Analysis Engine 
• The Packet Injection Engine 
  The packet capture engine captures traffic from a network. This traffic is then 
passed to the analysis engine where it can be analyzed by a number of sensors. The final 
step is to route the packet based on analysis results. The overall flow of information can 
be seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.   Stream Splitter Information Flow 
Figure 2 is a class interaction diagram showing how the major components 
interact with each other. It is important to note that there can be a number of both active 
and passive sensors. The stream splitter was designed as an architecture to be used to 
implement a traffic separation scheme. To meet this design requirement additional 
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sensors must be easily added to the splitter. This allows for a dynamic separation scheme 
and reuse of code for unique network configurations. 
 
Figure 2.   Class Interaction Diagram. 
 
1. Packet Capture 
In order to make use of a threaded architecture the packet capture engine must be 
implemented in a way such that it can run in its own thread. The analysis engine takes 
longer to analyze each packet than the capture engine takes to capture it from the wire. 
Further, the capture engine must be able to keep up with network traffic. The goal of the 
design was to be able to capture as many packets as Snort (www.snort.org), since snort is 
a well- known network analysis engine. 
In order to keep up with network traffic the capture engine must read frames from 
the wire and place the frames into a buffer in an efficient manner. Once a frame is placed 
in the buffer the capture engine is finished with it and can then capture the next frame. 
This allows the system to handle bursts of traffic and drop fewer packets. Packets are 
then removed from the buffer by the analysis engine. To accomplish this the capture 
engine must have a buffer and a lock for that buffer that are both shared with the analysis 




Figure 3.   Frame Capture Sequence 
 
2. Analysis Engine 
At the heart of the stream splitter are a number of sensors. Each sensor looks for a 
particular metric in the stream of information. If the sensor finds what that the current set 
of data is part of the sub-stream it is intended to evaluate then it takes the appropriate 
action. The use of sensors allows for a fine granularity in the type of information that is 
used to split a stream. The remainder of this paper will be concerned with stream splitting 
in a network environment. If the interest is in web traffic, a sensor that evaluates all 
packets that have a source or destination port of 80 would accomplish this.  
Sensors can be either active or passive. An active sensor would send data to a 
shared memory location where the system would then have to act upon the result of the 
sensor. A trust scheme where a sensor evaluates a packet for trust might return a trust 
value. A stream isolator on the other hand would simply route the packet and the system 
would not need to know anything about what the sensor had done.  
a. Active Sensors 
Active sensors are used for trust classification. These sensors are active 
because they do not route the packet but must send back information to some control loop 
that will then make the decision about routing the packet. Each active sensor looks at a 
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particular metric and communicates back a trust value based on that metric. Several 
active sensors may work together to perform a more thorough evaluation of a packet.  
When more than one active sensor is used a control structure is needed to gather 
the results from the sensors and to then make a routing decision based on gathered data. 
Fuzzy set theory is used in both the individual sensor analysis and also to make the final 
routing decision. Fuzzy logic is used for the speed with which a decision can be reached. 
More precision may be possible using Bayesian statistics, however the speed of fuzzy 
logic is of greater concern than added accuracy of a Bayesian model. This is a case where 
close is good enough.  
b. PassiveSensors 
Though similar to active sensors passive sensors are used for stream 
isolation. These sensors simply process each packet, if the packet does not match the 
criteria the sensor is looking for no action is taken. If the packet matches what the sensor 
is looking for further analysis is done. For instance a web traffic isolator would look for 
all tcp traffic with a source or destination port of 80. Once the packet is identified as 
being of interest to the isolator additional analysis may then be done. Currently rate 
analysis is done on traffic that matches the criteria of the isolator. Routing of the packet is 
then done based on this additional rate analysis.  
During the design of the system it made sense to separate the isolation scheme 
along the same lines as the OSI model. There is a layser-3 isolator that will separate 
layer-3 traffic out of a stream. There is also a layer-4 isolator that will separate out layer-
4 traffic. There was no need to perform isolation at layer-2 since this data changes as 
packets travel throughout the network. Any isolation above layer-4 would be application 
specific and would require in depth knowledge of the applications running on the 
network the splitter was going to be implemented on. Adding this functionality would 
simply be a matter of extending the layer-4 class to accommodate the type of traffic being 
isolated.  
The analysis engine consists of the Dispatcher and Sensors shown in figure 1. The 
Dispatcher is responsible for querying the buffer and then updating all the sensors with 
the new data that was obtained from the buffer. To ensure that all the sensors are looking 
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at the same information they must all work in lock step. That is to say that though the 
sensors perform their analysis independently, one sensor may not begin to work on the 
next frame until all sensors have completed their analysis of the current frame. Figure 4 
demonstrates this concept. 
 
Figure 4.   Analysis Sequence 
A way to achieve this is to use a lock for each sensor similar to the buffer lock 
used in the capture engine. The dispatcher locks all the sensors and then updates them 
with the latest data from the capture buffer. The dispatcher then unlocks the sensors 
which allows them to lock themselves and process the new information. Upon 
completion of their analysis each sensor will then unlock their lock allowing the 
dispatcher to once more take control of each sensor. To ensure that the sensor has 
processed the information there must be a variable that is reset each time the sensor is 
updated and then set by the sensor upon completion of analysis. This is necessary 
because there is no guarantee that each sensor thread will run before the dispatcher tries 
to relock the sensors. Figure 5 demonstrates this problem situation where the sensor is re-
locked prior to the analysis being completed. This will result in the sensor loosing 
synchronicity with the other sensors. The dispatcher, thinking that all sensors have 
completed the analysis of the previous packet, will try and send the next packet. This will 
result in the second packet not being analyzed.  
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Figure 5.   Incorrect Analysis Sequence  
 
3. Injection Engine 
Once a frame has been captured and analyzed it must then be replayed back to the 
network. There are two methods of doing the injection. First, the frame can be simply 
replayed out of an interface and maintain the integrity of the layer-2 data. This is a simple 
solution with the only down side being that this requires a separate interface for each 
stream that is used. An example of this type of injection is shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   One Interface Per Stream 
Another method for replaying and routing outbound traffic is to adjust the 
destination MAC address. By adjusting the destination MAC address to the address of the 
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interface on the IDS the stream is destined for, several streams may be sent out the same 
interface and then fed into a switch that will handle the routing. Figure 7 illustrates this.  
 
Figure 7.   Multiple Streams Using One Interface. 
 
Use of this method requires a buffer for the outgoing frames as one frame may belong to 
several streams. Once a sensor has decided the destination for a packet and the MAC is 
over written, the frame is then placed into a buffer from which the injection engine reads 
and replays Ethernet frames. A lock on the buffer ensures that only one thread is 
accessing the buffer at a time allowing all sensors requiring the ability to inject traffic to 
use the same injection engine. Using one injection engine alleviates the possibility that 
more than one entity will try to control the injection mechanism and also removes the 
need for an additional mutual exclusion lock surrounding the injection device. 
 In this chapter, the high level design of the prototype stream splitter was discussed 
along with reasoning for design decisions. The three major components of the stream 
splitter were identified and the purpose of each defined. Additionally, two methods of 
stream replay were discussed, one using multiple network interface cards for injection, 
the other using a single NIC for injection. The next chapter will discuss the 




There are two implementations of the stream splitter. The first was written in C++ 
and is detailed in this and the following chapter. The second, written in Objective-C, uses 
the same architecture but does not implement the trust analysis. Additionally, the 
Objective-C splitter routes all streams out a single interface and lets a switch do the 
routing to the particular IDS. Objective-C does not make as many virtual table look ups 
as C++ due to run time method cacheing, This results in a significant speed increase that 
is discussed in later chapters.  Both implementations use a similar packet capture engine 
and a similar injection engine.  
A. PACKET CAPTURE 
 Packet capture is accomplished through the use of the libpcap library. The libpcap 
library is a cross platform C library takes much of the tedium of dealing with packet 
capture  out of the hands of the programmer. The splitter uses a call back function that is 
called each time a packet is encountered. The libpcap library keeps the packet intact and 
gives a pcap packet header and a pointer to the captured packet to the programmer. Since 
the packet is kept intact it is much simpler to send the packet out on the wire during the 
injection phase.  
When a packet is encountered by the system it is immediately placed in a buffer 
where the dispatcher thread can later send it to the sensors. The packet is duplicated since 
the pcap library reuses the memory for subsequent packet captures. 
B. PACKET ANALYSIS 
As mentioned earlier there are two methods for analysis employed, trust analysis 
and stream isolation. For trust analysis the goal is to split the sniffed network stream into 
trusted and suspect streams. Trust analysis is used if the splitter is going to be placed in 
front of only two IDSs and the administrator is not interested in doing single service 
analysis, perhaps the IDS used already does single stream analysis.  
Stream isolation is used to separate a stream of interest from the main network 
stream. This is accomplished through the use of a passive sensor that upon encountering a 
packet belonging to the stream of interest is then analyzed and routed according to the 
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rules of the stream sensor. The difference between the stream splitter and an intelligent 
switch is the use of trust or rate anlysis in the stream splitting decision.  
As mentioned earlier, once a stream is isolated it can either all be sent out one 
interface or it can be sent out a number of interfaces. For instance if the goal is to isolate 
web traffic then the stream would be split according to port 80. Connections using port 80 
may then be evaluated using the same trust scheme as in trust analysis and then be routed 
accordingly. Using this method the result is a splitting of the network stream into service 
sub-streams which are then split into trusted and suspected streams. Of course this 
process can be interrupted at any level. If simply isolating the stream is enough for an 
analysis scheme, the splitter can do thatas well.  
Active sensors use the idea of trust to analyze packets. To develop this notion of 
trust each packet must be sent to a series of sensors. Each sensor implements a fuzzy 
membership function for both the Normal set and the Suspect set of traffic. The results 
are communicated back to the main control loop of the program via shared memory 
where all the results are analyzed and a best guess as to the trust of the packet is 
computed. Each sensor that is used has a weight associated with it so that if one sensor is 
found to be more reliable it can be weighted accordingly.  
This notion of trust is used in both trust analysis --if the stream is simply being 
split according to trust-- and also in stream isolation. When used in conjunction with 
stream isolation the result is a set of sub-streams based on a metric, for instance web 
traffic, one of which is considered normal traffic, the other suspect traffic.  
1. Sensor Calls 
When each sensor is instantiated it launches its own thread that will run as long as 
the application runs. This is done to increase the performance of the splitter and in an 
effort to make use of multiple CPU’s in the system if they are available. Threads are used 
instead of a separate process to allow for extensive use of shared memory. Threads also 
allow for faster context switching than a separate process would allow.  
Each sensor sees every packet the splitter captures. This is done so that the 
various metrics of each sensor can continue to be updated by the packets. For instance 
since a timestamp is only added to an ongoing connection once a set time interval has 
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elapsed, the connection sensor must see each packet so that the timestamp can be added 
at the appropriate time. The source sensor works in a similar manner. There is a drop in 
performance for continuing to evaluate every packet but this also allows for a stream to 
be re-classified. If this in-stream evaluation did not take place then the trust for the entire 
stream would be based on the first packet.  
2. Fuzzy Membership Functions 
The membership functions assign a number that is the computed trust value that 
will be associated with the packet. Since we can’t account for every possible connection 
that the system will see we must come up with a way of quantifying the trust value. One 
approach is to look at the packet and then increase or decrease its trust based on the 
packet parameters. A packet enters the system and is given a membership of .5 in each of 
the sets. When the packet is sent to the sensors each sensor will either increase or 
decrease the packets membership in each of the sets based on the information in the 
packet. For instance if the connection sensor feels that the packet is to be trusted then it 
will multiply the current trust by some number greater than1.0 this will increase the trust 
of the packet. The other case is that the packet is not to be trusted. In this case the current 
trust will be multiplied by a number less than 1.0. 
The problem with the above scheme is that the membership functions will return 
trust values greater than 1. This value is a trust value and sensor weight all in one. A 
better scheme is to have the sensor return a membership value and then weight that value 
in the result analysis function. By returning a membership value debugging becomes 
much easier and the results from the sensors are more intuitive.   
Once the packet has a membership value for each set there are a couple ways that 
we can decide which way to send it. The splitter can either simply send the packet to a 
given system if its membership value exceeds a set value or route the packet to the larger 
of the two membership values. By routing a packet if its membership exceeds a threshold 
value of membership it will become easier to test the system, with a threshold of  0 for 
each set all traffic will be sent out both NICs. If traffic is only allowed to be sent out one 
NIC then the total amount of traffic out of the system can be decreased. 
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This approach gives rise to the question of whether the set of connections 
belonging to the suspect set is mutually exclusive of the set of connections belonging to 
the normal traffic set. This is to say that µsuspect (x) =1−µnormal (x). Enforcing this policy 
would ensure that all traffic will be sent to one of the IDSs. If this restriction is relaxed 
then we can still maintain that all traffic will be sent to at least one of the IDSs by our 
routing rules.  
If  (µsuspect (x) > suspect_setpoint) Then send packet to suspect IDS 
If (µnormal (x) > normal_setpoint)  Then send packet to normal IDS 
If (!(µsuspect (x) > suspect_setpoint) AND ! (µnormal (x) > normal_setpoint)) 
Then by default send traffic to suspect IDS 
This would ensure that traffic will be sent to at least one IDS. There is the 
possibility of overlap between the two outputs, however this may not necessarily be a bad 
thing. It would be very obvious when a connection is moved from the suspect stream to 
the trusted stream since there would be duplicated information sent out on both streams. 
3. Stream Interruption  
 When a packet enters the system there are two possibilities it is either associated 
with an existing connection or recognized as a new connection. Each packet entering the 
system is sent to all the sensors each of which analyze the packet according to their 
unique perspectives. If the packet is not part of a previously identified connection then a 
connection node must be setup. It is only after the examination of this first packet that a 
trust value can be associated with the connection. This is also true for connectionless 
protocols such as UDP. Remember that a connection consists of a source IP, destination 
IP , and a service. There is also the issue of what to do with the first packet of a 
connection.  
There are a couple of ways that connection-based trust can be determined. First, 
the system may be designed such that any packet belonging to a connection that is not 
specifically diverted from the suspect IDS will be sent to the suspect IDS. By doing this 
the system can work out the trust value for a connection and then update the rule set of 
the splitter. Packets belonging to a trusted connection will no longer be sent to the low-
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trust IDS. Further, the trusted IDS will no longer see all the data for a given connection 
so the possibility of missing an attack on a trusted connection increases with this option. 
Another option is to hold each packet when it enters the system until a 
determination as to the trust of the connection to which it belongs can be made. This 
would mean that a buffer would have to be used to hold packets under examination. This 
would open the system up to the possibility that if flooded with new connections the 
system could crash or be slowed to the point that an attack could be launched while the 
system was busy analyzing new connections. The addition of a buffer for incoming 
packets helps with this but does not remove the possibility of a denial of service attack.  
An additional way of viewing these two solutions is that the first assumes that the 
fuzzy classification of inbound connections is done separately from the splitting of 
network traffic. That is traffic is diverted from a default path only after a decision is 
made. Prior to that traffic will flow through the system on the default path. The splitter 
simply responds to rules that are dynamically updated by the fuzzy classifier. 
In the second option network traffic is detained until analysis of the connection is 
complete. Several packets may be needed to establish that a connection is actually active. 
This means that the fuzzy classification mechanism must be integrated into the splitter 
such that no routing may take place until each packet entering has been analyzed. This 
introduces a bottleneck into the system.  
To get around the problem of holding packets until a connection can be 
determined the splitter simply evaluates on a packet basis. This was done since there is 
still the opportunity for sensors that want to do “connection” analysis to keep the data 
that the sensor needs but the overall system is not slowed while waiting for the sensor to 
gather data. The splitter still waits on the results of every sensor but it is hoped that 
through extensive use of threads the amount of dropped traffic can be kept to a minimum. 
Each sensor that does more extensive analysis must be implemented in such a way as to 
not introduce a situation in which the sensor is waiting for the next packet before 
reporting its results for the current one. If the sensors are implemented correctly each 
sensor should check to see if the packet is of interest to the sensor prior to doing any CPU 
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intensive calls. If the packet is of the wrong type the sensor should just return a value 
indicating that it should be ignored. No sensors in the prototype have this problem. 
C. PACKET INJECTION 
 There is a large difference in the way packets are injected depending on the type 
of sensor that is in use. Active sensors must report their findings to a control structure 
that then handles packet injection. Stream isolators inject packets themselves. Regardless 
of where the logic for packet injection is located all packet injection makes use of the 
same underlying library to actually write the packets to the wire, libnet. 
The easiest and cleanest way to accomplish packet injection was to use the libnet 
library written by Mike D. Schiffman. The source code for libnet can be found at 
http://www.packetfactory.net/libnet/ The Libnet library provides a way to do layer-2 
packet injection on a linux/unix system.  
When Libpcap captures a packet, the packet is stored as an array of u_char 
elements. It so happens that the libnet advanced write function takes a u_char pointer as a 
total length and then writes the wire ready packet to a specified interface. Libpcap 
supplies all this information in the pcap packet header so it is a simple matter to write the 
packet out to the wire with the libnet_write function.  
As mentioned earlier an alternative to the use of a separate network card for each 
stream to be sent out of the splitter is to use the MAC address of the destination IDS. 
Layer-2 is no longer maintained under this scheme but it does allow for multiple streams 
to be sent out a single NIC. If the output interface is plugged directly into a switch then 
the destination IDS can still be used with their interfaces in promiscuous mode. If a 
switch is not used then the IDS will have to do some additional filtering. The Objective-C 
implementation of the splitter uses this MAC address routing. 
In this chapter the implementation of the stream splitter was described. Rationale 
for major decisions made during the implementation was given, external libraries used in 
the stream splitter were described, and the fuzzy logic model introduced. In addition the 
stream interruption problem was discussed. The next chapter will talk about each of the 
sensors used in the stream splitter will be discussed along with abstract data types 
developed to support the prototypes. 
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IV. SENSOR DESIGN 
There are a number of sensors used in the splitter. Each sensor looks at a 
particular aspect of network traffic. The number of sensors is dependent on the system 
administrator’s needs for traffic separation. A simple stream isolator may have only one 
passive sensor, where as a trust analysis splitter may use an extensive array of both active 
and passive sensors.  
Sensors rely on several supporting data structures to function efficiently. There 
are defined structures for IP headers, TCP headers, and UDP headers. There are also  
specialized data structures used for the nodes in the Adelson-Velskii and Landis blanced 
binary search trees (AVL trees) found in a number of the sensors. There is also a 
buffernode used to encapsulate a newly arrived packet and ready it for queuing in the 
captured packet buffer. This chapter will discuss the use of these data structures and 
features integrated into the design of the data types.  
 
A. THREADING THE SENSORS 
As stated earlier in an attempt to increase system performance each sensor is run 
in its own persistent thread. The thread for each sensor is launched at the beginning of the 
program and executes until the main thread exits. The main thread instantiates all the 
sensors, initializes the libpcap and libnet libraries, launches the sensor threads, and 
launches the dispatcher thread.  
Each sensor is a derived class of the “Sensor” base class. The base class has a 
mutex of type pthread_mutex_t as well as a conditional variable of type pthread_cond_t. 
These variables protect the packet information as well as the membership variables that 
the sensor uses to communicate the results of the sensor back to the dispatcher thread. 
The dispatcher thread acts as the control structure for both passive and active sensors. 
Active sensors require a control structure to correlate the results they generate and to 
make the final decision as to where to route the packet. Passive sensors merely pass back 
a “complete” signal, and only need to be told when a new packet is ready for analysis.  
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When a packet is encountered, main instantiates a new buffer node. Two calls to 
memcopy copy the packet and the associated pcap packet header into the new buffer 
node. A timestamp is then added and the buffer mutex is locked. With the buffer mutex 
locked, the node is placed into the buffer and the number of packets in the buffer is 
incremented. The mutex is then unlocked and if the number of packets in the buffer is 
greater than or equal to one the dispatcher thread is signaled. This last check of packets in 
the buffer reduces the number of unnecessary signals sent to the dispatcher thread.  
The dispatcher thread is then awoken by a signal from the capture thread and 
removes the first packet on the list. The dispatcher then locks all the sensor mutexes and 
updates the packet information in the sensors to point to the data in the newly removed 
buffer node. With this done, the dispatcher unlocks all the sensor’s mutexes and 
broadcasts via each sensor’s conditional variable to signal that the packet information is 
new and must be processed.  
Once a sensor is woken up it checks to see that the return locations for the 
membership functions have been reset. This check ensures that a spurious wake up will 
not cause a packet to be analyzed twice. Providing that the return values have indeed 
been reset, the sensor then calls the derived class’s “analyzePacket” function. When this 
function returns, the sensor will have analyzed the packet and the return variables 
updated. The sensor then loops back to the top of the execution loop and, since the return 
variables are not in a reset condition, the sensor goes back to sleep to await a new signal 
from the dispatcher.  
By waiting on the conditional variable the sensor unlocks it’s mutex allowing the 
dispatcher thread to gain access to the results of the sensor’s analysis. The dispatcher 
waits for control over all sensors before continuing. Once it has all the sensor mutexes 
locked it can then analyze the results and route the packets accordingly.  
The exception to this is with stream isolators. This type of sensor routes packets 
itself. This is done since there may be many types of sub-streams and each one will have 
to be routed differently. It is more efficient to have each isolator route packets itself. This 
also allows for a trust scheme to be employed on the traffic as well as a stream isolation 
scheme.  
23 
Once the analysis function returns, the dispatcher checks to see if there are more 
packets to be analyzed. If there are then it locks the buffer mutex, decrements the number 
of packets on the buffer by one, removes the first packet from the list, and then the 
process repeats.  
B. ADDRESS NODES 
The address nodes consist of a 32 bit source address and a list of timestamps. The 
natural ordering of this set is imposed by viewing the address as an unsigned 32 bit 
integer. The list of timestamps is used to keep track of how often the source IP has been 
seen. Once a timestamp has been added to the list of timestamps it will stay there for a 
period of time defined by the system administrator prior to execution. As a protective 
measure against a Denial Of Service(DOS) attack a time stamp can only be added once 
every time interval where the time interval is defined in the address node class. The 
amount of time a timestamp remains on the list and the amount of time between 
timestamps need not be the same. 
When an attempt to add a timestamp is made the first thing that is done is a check 
to ensure that enough time has elapsed to allow the addition to take place. If it has not 
been long enough to add the timestamp, it is not added. With each call to add a timestamp 
the list of timestamps is also purged of old timestamps.  
C. CONNECTION NODES 
Connection Nodes are similar to address nodes in that they perform the function 
of keeping track of what the sensor has seen. A connection node contains source and 
destination addresses in the form of 32 bit unsigned integers, a service port, and a list of 
time stamps. The connection node keeps track of the direction of the connection. It is the 
responsibility of the sensor to determine the direction and service being used.  
The ordering of this set comes from looking at the larger of the addresses. Ties of 
the larger of the IP addresses are handled by comparing the second addresses. If this also 
results in a tie then the service will break the tie. If all three match then the nodes are 
equal. Though ephemeral ports could be used to break ties the stream splitter is 
concerned only that the connection belongs to two physical computers. Two simultaneous 
24 
connections between two computers would be viewed as the same connection by the 
stream splitter. 
Connection node timestamps are handled in an identical manner to address node 
time stamps. A time stamp can only be added if a set amount of time has elapsed since 
the last time stamp was added and the time stamps only live on the list for finite amount 
of time. As with the address node timestamps this adds a bit of protection against a DOS 
attack.  
D. CONNNECTION SENSOR 
 There are two views that can be taken for the connection sensor. One is that the 
connection sensor should see all the other sensors in an attempt to get a better idea of the 
trust of the connection and also act as the control structure for the other sensors. This 
would lead to a hierarchy of the sensors with the connection sensor at the top of the list 
and all other sensors subordinate to it. I have taken a different approach, each sensor 
makes its decision independent of the other sensors. This puts all sensors in a flat 
hierarchical structure. In the final step of the trust evaluation process all sensor results are 
weighted, this gives the ability to put more value on one sensor than another. If the 
connection sensor were allowed to call all of the other sensors this would no longer be 
possible.  
 The connection sensor tries to match all TCP packets to an existing connection. If 
the packet can’t be matched to an existing connection then a new connection has been 
identified and must be setup using a new connection node. The connection sensor ignores 
all non-TCP traffic by returning an ignore code in the “suspectMembership” and 
“normalMembership” variables.  
 The connection sensor makes use of an AVL tree to store all connections the 
system has seen in the form of connection nodes.  An AVL tree is used for its speed of 
access. It may take a bit longer to add a new node but once a node is added it will not be 
removed so emphasis is placed on lookup speed and not necessarily insertion speed. 
 The connection sensor uses a very simple algorithm for its fuzzy membership 
functions. Trust is based on how often a particular connection has been seen. The number 
of times a connection has been seen is determined by the number of timestamps in the 
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connection node for a particular connection. A connection is determined to be trusted if it 
has been seen a certain number of times within a defined trust window. The system 
administrator must define the window and trust threshold. The fuzzy membership 
functions are shown in figure 8 and figure 9. 
µNormal = # timestampstrustThreshold  
Figure 8.   Normal Set Membership Function 
 
µSuspect =1− # timestampstrustThreshold  
Figure 9.   Suspect Membership Function 
These values are then returned to the sensor control structure, in the case of the prototype 
dispatcher thread. 
 The “analyzePacket” function is called from the sensor base class and starts the 
analysis process for each packet the system captures.  The connection sensor first verifies 
that the packet is a TCP packet, next it builds a temporary connection node that will be 
used to search the AVL tree. The temporary node is built as a directed connection. This is 
to say that based on the location of the service port a determination as to the direction of 
overall information flow can be established. As an example, if the source port was 80 
then the sensor would assume that the packet is a response from a web server.  
A search of the AVL tree for the temporary node will find the node and set a 
pointer to the node in the tree, or a new node will be added to the tree and then the search 
repeated to get a pointer to the newly added node. This is done to ensure that the node has 
been successfully added to the tree.  
 Upon finding the connection node to which the packet belongs the node is 
updated with the current timestamp and old time stamps are removed from the timestamp 
list. The pointer to the node is then sent to the fuzzy membership functions. The fuzzy 
membership functions return the membership of the connection node in the set of normal 
and suspect traffic sets. These membership values are then stored in 
“normalMembership” and “suspectMembership”, both of which are located in the sensor 
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base class. Once the membership variables have been updated the mutex covering the 
connection sensor can safely be unlocked to allow the control structure to retrieve the 
results.  
E. SOURCE SENSOR 
The source sensor works in a manner very similar to the connection sensor. The 
source sensor looks at the source of every packet and keeps track of how many times it 
has seen a particular source through the use of address nodes stored in an AVL tree. 
Like all sensors the start of analysis is when the “analyzePacket” function is 
called. The sensor first extracts the source IP from the packet. A temporary address node 
is made with the newly acquired IP address for purpose of searching the AVL tree. A 
search of the existing AVL tree yields two possibilities, either the node exists or it does 
not. If the node does not exist it is created and added to the tree. If the node had to be 
added then an additional search is done to ensure that the node can be recalled from the 
tree. Upon finding the node in the AVL tree a call is made to “addCurrentTimestamp()” 
which adds the current timestamp to the node. In the process of adding the current 
timestamp old timestamps that have exceeded their lifetime on the list are removed.  
Once the node has been updated then a pointer to the node is passed to both the 
normal and suspect membership functions; normalMembershipFunc(), and 
suspectMembershipFunc() respectively. This sensor makes use of simple fuzzy 
membership functions similar to the connection sensor. The membership functions store 
their results in “normalMembership” and “suspectMembership”, located in the sensor 
base class. With the membership values computed the sensor is finished with analysis and 
the mutual exclusion lock covering the sensor can now safely be unlocked. 
F. UDP SENSOR 
The UDP sensor does for UDP packets what the connection sensor does for TCP 
packets. The basic functionality is the same. The “analyzePacket” is the function that is 
called by the sensor base class and starts the analysis process within the sensor.  
The first thing that happens in the sensor is that the packet is verified to be a UDP 
packet. If the packet is non-UDP then ignore codes are returned in place of membership 
values via the “normalMembership” and “suspectMembership” variables.  
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The UDP sensor also makes use of directed connections. Once a packet is 
recognized as being a UDP packet then a temporary connection node is built in such a 
manner that the source and destination addresses are in agreement with the flow of 
information. This is accomplished by looking at the location of the service port. A port is 
considered to be a service if it is less than 1024. Currently no attempt to handle service 
ports greater than 1024 is made. If the destination port is a service port, then the sensor 
assumes that the orientation of the source and destination addresses are correct. If the 
source port is a destination port, then the source and destination addresses for the 
temporary node will be reversed.  
Once the temporary node is built then the AVL tree is searched for a node 
matching the temporary. If a node can not be found in the tree then the temporary node is 
added and then the tree is searched again to ensure the node was added and to obtain a 
pointer to it. 
Having established a pointer to the node in the AVL tree, the fuzzy membership 
functions are called. The UDP sensor makes use of the same fuzzy membership functions 
as the connection sensor. The results of the membership functions are stored in 
“suspectMembership” and “normalMembership”, both found in the sensor base class. 
Analysis accomplished, the sensor mutex is unlocked and the sensor waits for the next 
packet. 
G. LAYER-3 ISOLATOR 
 The layer-3 isolator is the first of the stream isolators. Stream isolators are passive 
sensors. Stream isolators do not report back results to a controlling structure. Instead 
isolators simply analyze traffic and when a packet is of the correct type additional 
analysis is done and ultimately a routing decision is made.  
 Like active sensors the layer-3 isolator is a sub-class of the sensor base class. This 
ensures that the isolator is run in its own thread. This also allows the isolator to run in 
parallel with active sensors and be launched from the same control structure that is 
controlling the active sensors. To do this the isolator must return an ignore code to the 
control structure using  “suspectMembership” and “normalMembership” from the sensor 
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base class. This ignore code must be passed in order to alert the sensor control structure 
that the isolator has completed its analysis.  
 The layer-3 isolator is currently the lowest level on the OSI model that the splitter 
is currently implemented to support. That is to say that the splitter can isolate a stream 
based solely on the layer-3 protocol of the packet. The layer-3 isolator is designed such 
that stream isolators for higher OSI layers will build on top of the layer-3 isolator. With 
this in mind the layer-3 isolator holds an AVL tree that consists of a set of isolator nodes. 
In keeping with this idea of forming a base for other isolators, the layer3synch function 
checks to ensure that that the packet is of the correct layer-3 type. This type is passed to 
the isolator by way of the layer-3 isolator constructor at initialization. If the packet is of 
the correct type, layer3synch will return true, the Ethernet header pointer will be pointing 
to the start of the Ethernet frame and the currently implemented IP header will be 
pointing at the start of the IP packet held in the “pdata” data structure. With the intention 
for the layer-3 isolator to serve as only a base class for an isolator, there is no 
“analyzePacket” function defined.  
 An AVL tree is used for the storage of the isolator nodes for its speed of access 
and also to avoid the need for using an additional storage class in the system. With all of 
the active sensors using AVL trees for the storage of their respective nodes it made sense 
to continue the trend.  
H. LAYER-4 ISOLATOR 
The layer-4 isolator is a passive sensor. Like the layer-3 isolator the layer-4 
isolator is designed to be used as a base class for all isolators that need to isolate a layer-4 
stream. The layer-4 isolator is a derived class from the layer-3 isolator. This allows the 
layer-3 isolator class to perform the checks of the packets at layer-3 through a call to 
layer3synch(). If the packet matches at layer-3 then layer4synch is called. The 
layer4synch function call checks to ensure that the packet is of the correct layer-4 type. 
The layer-4 packet type as well as the layer-3 type is passed in to the layer-4 constructor. 
The layer-4 constructor in turn calls the layer-3 constructor giving the layer-3 constructor 
the correct packet type information.  
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Like the layer-3 isolator the layer-4 isolator is designed such that it is only a base 
class for the development of layer-4 isolators. The web traffic isolator talked about later 
in this chapter is an example of how the layer-4 and layer-3 isolators work together to 
form a base for stream isolators.  
The layer-4 isolator constructor takes a layer-3 type, layer-4 protocol, and a port 
number as arguments. Alternatively this information can be supplied later by only 
specifying a layer-3 type to the constructor. Once initialized the layer4synch function 
becomes available for use. This does a very similar function to the layer3synch function 
in that it tests the incoming packet to ensure that it is of the correct type that the isolator 
is looking for in terms of proper protocol and service. An additional feature available at 
layer-4 is the ability to apply a mask to the addresses being examined. This mask is 
applied to the IP addresses before the isolator node is built. This gives the isolator the 
ability to view traffic in terms of belonging to a subnet mask. The layer-4 isolator class 
also provides the buildTempNode() function that is used to build the temporary node that 
is used in searching the AVL tree.  
I. WEB TRAFFIC ISOLATOR  
The web traffic isolator is an example of how the layer-3 and layer-4 isolators 
work together to form the base for a higher-level stream isolator. The purpose of the 
traffic isolator is to sort out all port 80 web traffic, classify it in terms of directed 
connections, and finally route packets according to the frequency with which the packets 
belonging to a connection are seen by the system. The idea is to be able to separate out 
low data rate connections from normal traffic connections.  
The web traffic isolator looks for all TCP packets that have a source or destination 
port of 80. As with active sensors the web traffic isolator has an analyzePacket function 
that is called from the sensor base class for each packet that is captured by the system.  
The web isolator makes use of the layer-4 isolator as well as the layer-3 isolator for 
identifying the packet as being of interest.  
The analysis of a packet by the web isolator is done in a similar manner to that of 
the active sensors. The packet is tested against the layer3synch function, and upon 
success is tested against the layer4synch function. If both of these functions return true 
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the packet is of interest to the isolator. This shows how the web traffic isolator builds on 
top of the layer-4 isolator, which in turn builds on top of what the layer-3 isolator does. 
Once a packet is identified as the correct type for the isolator, a temporary isolator 
node is built with the information from the packet. Next, the AVL tree from the layer-3 
isolator is searched for the node. If a match is made a pointer to the node in the AVL tree 
is established. If a match is not made then the temporary node is added to the AVL tree 
and another search is done to ensure that the node has indeed been added to the tree. In 
testing it was found that if this additional check was not done the node would 
occasionally not be added to the tree. 
With a pointer to the isolator node in the AVL tree, the node is then “touched” to 
increment the counter in the node. The value of the current time bin is then used to decide 
which interface to send the packet out. To make this decision a simple threshold is used. 
If the current time bin value is greater than the threshold for slow traffic it is sent out the 
normal traffic interface. When a connection is first seen the value of the previous time bin 
is set to –1 so that a new connection is not sent to the slow traffic until it is seen enough 
to be sent to the normal traffic interface. This is done so that a normal connection does 
not mistakenly get sent to the slow interface simply because it had not been seen before. 
J.  OBJECTIVE-C SENSORS 
The Objective-C implementation makes use of a very similar sensor architecture. 
The differences are noted here. The Objective-C implementation uses NSThreads instead 
of pthreads. This is of little consequence since NSThreads are built on top of pthreads. 
The pthread_cond_t data type is replaced with a NSConditionLock data type. The AVL 
trees have been replaced with an NSDictionaries. The Dictionary uses a hash table as its 
underlying data type giving faster insertion than an AVL tree. There is no fuzzy logic 
functionality in the Objective-C implementation. The BufferNode, and IsolatorNode data 
types are essentially the same only ported to Objective-C. The logic for each is identical 
to its C++ equivalent. The same is true for the Layer-4 isolator in the Objective-C 
implementation.  
In this chapter the sensors and major abstract data types of the prototypes were 
discussed in detail. Additionally, multi-threading of the prototype was also discussed. 
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Source code for all the sensors and abastract data types is included in the this thesis in the 
form of an appendix. The next chapter details the testing of the stream splitter and 
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V. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS 
The goal of this thesis was to show that a robust architecture for traffic separation 
could be implemented. To do this there were two things that had to be shown: (1)the 
splitter must be able to keep up with network traffic and (2)it must also implement a 
separation scheme that would not be possible with a router. If both of these criteria are 
not met then the value of the splitter is greatly diminished. Two tests were devised that 
would show each of these necessities, a capture efficiency test and a test to show accurate 
traffic separation. 
A. CAPTURE EFFICIENCY 
To test the ability of the splitter to capture network traffic,Tcpreplay 
(tcpreplay.sourceforge.net) was used to replay a tcpdump file from the 1999 DARPA IDS 
Evaluation done at MIT. Specifically, the week one Tuesday inside dump data was used. 
Tcpreplay gives the option of specifying how fast to replay the file. The testing started at 
5 Mb/s and then increased in 5Mb/s increments to 75 Mb/s. After the file had been 
completely replayed the capture engine could be examined to see how many packets it 
had captured. This test was run with the Objective-C version of the splitter, the C++ 
version of the splitter, and also with Snort 1.9 and Snort 2.0. The base configuration of 
snort was used in both cases. Snort 1.9 was tried with both ascii logging and binary 
logging, while snort 2.0 used only binary logging. All tests were run on a Macintosh dual 
1.42Ghz G4 with 2 gigabytes of RAM. The test setup is shown in Figure 10. 
 




This first test looked only at how many packets the splitter could capture out of 
the stream of packets that was sent to it. Analysis of the packets takes longer than the 
capture process so once the stream had been sent, analysis was halted and the number of 
packets sent to the buffer of the splitter was taken to be the number of packets that was 
captured. This does not reflect the number of packets that can be captured and processed 
during continuous operation. When the splitter was stopped there were often a significant 
number of packets in the buffer waiting to be processed. Only packets that were analyzed 
by snort were counted since if the packet is dropped prior to analysis it will not be 
analyzed at all as snort does not buffer packets as the stream splitter does. 
Snort, which is implemented in C, outperformed both the Objective-C version of 
the splitter and the C++ version of the splitter. The Objective-C splitter outperformed the 
C++ version. This makes sense because in C++ there will be virtual table lookups that 
will take time to complete whereas with Objective-C, method calls are cached at run time 
to increase performance. The results of this test are detailed in figure 11. After running 
this test it became apparent that a hardware solution to capture traffic is necessary for any 






























































Figure 11.   Packet Capture Efficiency 
As mentioned earlier one of the differences between the two implementations is 
that the C++ version makes use of AVL trees, the Objective-C version uses hash tables in 
the form of NSDictionaries. During testing it became clear that the balancing of the AVL 
trees was too expensive. The program would periodically appear to hang. After attaching 
a thread monitor to the program the sensor thread was continuously operating but the 
dispatch thread was not. This meant that the sensor thread was trying to analyze just one 
packet. For the experiment the only analysis being done was simply finding the correct 
node in the AVL tree and then incrementing a counter. If the node did not exist in the tree 
it must be added to the tree. Adding a node causes the tree to be rebalanced. I also found 
that during testing occasionally the AVL tree would not find a node that had been added 
36 
to the tree and would attempt to re-add it. This would result in an additional rebalance of 
the tree.  
B. TRAFFIC SEPARATION 
To show that the splitter can implement a traffic separation scheme an experiment 
was devised that made use of the IDS test bed already set up at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. This test bed uses a Smart Bits 6000 chassis and six two-port traffic generation 
blades. Each blade can be configured to send out a variety traffic. For this experiment, 
two ports were used on the Smart Bits 6000 chassis, one for fast traffic and one for slow 
traffic. The output of the splitter was passed to an eight port Linksys Switch. Also 
connected to the switch were interface three and interface four of a Dell 2650 server 
running Windows 2000 Server. A diagram of the network is shown in figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.   Test Bed Setup 
The splitter was configured so that it would look for TCP traffic utilizing port 80. 
The window size was set to ten seconds with a high/low traffic threshold of 100 packets. 
The IP addresses were chosen so that when viewed in a large table they would stand out 
from one another. The test traffic is detailed in table 1. MAC information is not shown in 
table 1 as the splitter overwrites the destination MAC address in the process of routing 
the traffic. 
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Traffic Stream Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port 
Fast 10.10.10.1 10.10.10.2 80 11000 
Slow 192.168.10.10 190.168.10.20 80 12000 
Table 1.   Traffic Stream Description 
Since the splitter and both generators could not be started at the same time the 
first step in the experiment was to start the traffic generators. With the traffic generators 
running the stream splitter was then configured and started. Configuration of the splitter 
consisted of setting the following parameters:  
- MAC addresses for the two interface on the windows server. 
- A threshold level of 100. 
- A service port of 80.  
- A ten second time window.  
- A protocol type of TCP.  
The traffic generators were then supplying traffic to the splitter and the splitter 
was processing the traffic. Ethereal was then allowed to capture traffic on both of the 
monitored interfaces for sixty seconds. This experiment was run three times. The results 
are shown in table 2. 
Test Number Fast Traffic Packets Slow Traffic Packets 
1 6000 120 
2 5900 120 
3 5900 120 
Table 2.   Traffic Capture Test Results 
These results are what was expected since the starting and stopping of Ethereal 
could not be synchronized with the traffic generators the fast traffic should be within 100 
packets of 6000 and the slow traffic should be within 2 packets of 120.  
It should be noted that in order for the switch to be able to route the packets by the 
destination MAC address, each interface had to send data through the switch prior to the 
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experiment. This was accomplished by simply pinging out each interface on the Dell 
computer to a nonexistent IP address.  This allows the switch to learn the interfaces that 
are connected to it. When a packet containing the MAC address of a connected interface 
arrives at the switch it is routed through the correct port to the attached interface. In this 
case one of two interfaces on the Dell server. 
C. SUMMARY 
The two experiments conducted in this chapter demonstrated the ability of the 
prototype splitter to achieve the objectives of traffic capture and separation in 
environments typically seen at organizational ingress points. The next chapter 




VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through the design of two software-based prototypes and follow on 
experimentation, we have shown that it is possible to isolate a stream of interest from a 
larger network stream. Further, through the development of the prototype, a robust 
architecture was established and was shown to be capable of isolating a network stream. 
Future work will undoubtedly center on optimization of the architecture and additional 
uses for the stream splitter. 
A. OPTIMIZATION 
1. Internal Data Structures 
The current Objective-C stream splitter is a proof of concept prototype. As such it 
was coded for correctness not for speed. Hash tables were used for the internal data 
structures that hold connection descriptions. These structures can grow quite large and 
there may be a better data structure that would lead to an improvement in system 
performance. A better performing data structure would allow for an increase in system 
performance.   
All of the buffers used in the splitter are linked lists. Like the hash table these too 
may not be the most appropriate choice for this type of data storage. The decision to use a 
linked list was based on the ability of the linked list to grow as more packets are captured. 
Use of the linked list allows the buffers to grow constrained only by the system. This was 
done because during testing it became clear that the capture buffer was going to grow 
quite large with network speeds greater than 20Mb/s.  
2. Data Capture 
The packet capture test showed that if the splitter is to be used in a modern 
operational network then the packet capture functionality would have to be improved. 
The limiting factor for network capture is currently the pcap packet capture library. In 
order to make better use of the network interface a faster method for packet capture must 
be found. Until then there will always be lost packets so any meaningful analysis of a 
connection must take into account the packets that were missed by the capture engine. 
For instance when a connection is made the third part of a three-way handshake may be 
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missed. This condition must be dealt with or there will not be a way to accurately model 
the network and perform analysis on it. 
If the data capture functionality could be moved out of software and into a 
hardware implementation, system performance would be greatly improved. Further 
analysis of the libpcap library could lead to an answer as to why all the snort test results 
were so similar. This could be a result of the libpcap library being the limiting factor for 
system performance. 
B. FUZZY LOGIC 
The fuzzy logic model was not implemented in the Objective-C stream splitter. 
Future work could port the C++ fuzzy model to Objective-C and include it in the 
objective-c stream splitter. The fuzzy logic model in its current form only looks at 
frequency of an IP address and the frequency of the connection. This could be expanded 
to look at other aspects of network traffic.  
 If the stream splitter is used for a different type of system the fuzzy logic model 
could prove to be valuable. The fuzzy logic allows the splitter to do more intelligent 
routing of streams. An increase in the complexity of the fuzzy logic model could yield 
better results.   
C. ADDITIONAL USES 
This paper dealt with a network architecture where the basic data unit is the 
Ethernet frame. This architecture can be expanded to any system in which a base data 
type can be defined. For instance a hard drive may be scanned in using the file as the 
basic data type. Using this splitter scheme the hard drive may be mined for any type of 
data. The payoff is that the hard drive only has to be read in once. After being read the 
files are then separated into similar types. In this manner a large amount of information 
may be processed.  
Using a similar technique to the hard drive problem above, the splitter could be 
adapted to a variety of data mining applications. Wading through log files comes to mind 
as an area of use. Set the splitter at the log collection facility and then let it sort through 
all the incoming logs. With the ease of configuration it could make classifying and 
sorting logs a much easier task.  
41 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  Cormen, Thomas, Leisserson, Charles, Rivest, Ronald, Stein, Clifford, 
Introduction to Algorithms Second Edition, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2001 
 
[2]  Joshua W. Haines, Richard P. Lippmann, David J. Fried, Eushiuan Tran, Steve 
Boswell, Marc A. Zissman, "1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection System 
Evaluation: Design and Procedures", MIT Lincoln Laboratory Technical Report, 
Technical Report 1062 
 
[3]  Joshua Haines, Lee Rossey, Rich Lippmann and Robert Cunnigham, "Extending 
the 1999 Evaluation", In the Proceedings of DISCEX 2001, June 11-12, Anaheim, 
CA. 
 
[4]  Lippmann, R.P., Fried D.J., Graf, I., Haines, J.W., Kendall, K.R., McClung, D., 
Weber, D., Webster, S.E., Wyschogrod, D., Cunningham, R.K., Zissman, M.A., 
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 2000. DISCEX 
00. Proceedings , Volume: 2 , 1999 Page(s): 12 -26 vol.2 
 
[5]  Newman, David, Snyder, Joel, Thayer, Rodney “Eight IDSs fail to impress during 
the monthlong test on a production network.”, 
http://www.nwfusion.com/techinsider/2002/0624security1.html, 
Network World, 06/24/02 
 
[6]  Pedrycz, Witold, Fuzzy Modelling Paradigms and Practice, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Massachusetts, 1996 
 
 
[7] Timm, Kevin “Strategies to Reduce False Positives and False Negatives” 




































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
43 
APPENDIX A. C++ AVLTREE.H 
// AVL Tree Implementation 
// (c) Copyright 2002 William A. McKee.  All rights reserved. 
// 
// 
// The template class AVL::Node (used in AVL::Tree) requires the following: 
// 
//   T::T (const T &); 
//   T::~T (); 
//   bool T::operator < (const T & rhs) const; 
//   bool T::operator == (const T & rhs) const; 
//  
// For printing purposes one must declare: 
// 












// Use "namespace" to make sure the class names don't conflict with other code. 
// 
 
namespace AVL { 
 
// 
// The basic unit of currency in a tree are the nodes that comprise it. 
// 





// This is were we keep the data we want to store in each node. 
// It is const because if you change it while it is in the tree structure 
// you compromise the integrity of the tree. 
// It is public because the Tree class must have access to it in order 
// to return it after being found with the found_node function. 
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// Each node has two children: left and right.  If they are both NULL then 
// the node is a leaf node.  Otherwise, it's an interior node. 
 
    Node<T> * left, * right; 
 
// The height is computed to be: 0 if NULL, 1 for leaf nodes, and the maximum 
// height of the two children plus 1 for interior nodes. 
// This is used to keep the tree balanced. 
 
    int height; 
 
    void compute_height () 
    { 
        height = 0; 
        if (left != NULL && left -> height > height) 
            height = left -> height; 
        if (right != NULL && right -> height > height) 
            height = right -> height; 
        height += 1; 
    } 
 
// The constructor is private because the nodes are self allocating. 
 
    Node (const T & inData) 
        : data (inData), left (NULL), right (NULL), height (1) 
    { 




// Recursively delete the children if this node is being nuked. 
 
    ~Node () 
    { 
        delete left; 
        delete right; 
    } 
 
// Recursively insert some data into the tree then balance it on the way up. 
 
    Node<T> * insert_node (const T & inData) 
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    { 
        if (this == NULL) 
            return new Node<T> (inData); 
 
        if (inData < data) 
            left = left -> insert_node (inData); 
        else 
            right = right -> insert_node (inData); 
        return balance (); 
    } 
 
// Recursively find some data in the tree and if found return a pointer 
// to the node containing the data.  If not found then return NULL. 
 
    Node<T> * find_node (const T & inData) //const 
    { 
        if (this == NULL) 
            return NULL; 
 
        if (inData == data) 
            return this; 
 
        if (inData < data) 
            return left -> find_node (inData); 
        else 
            return right -> find_node (inData); 
    } 
 
// Recursively search the tree for some data and if found remove (delete) it. 
// When you remove an interior node the right child must be place right of 
// the right most child in the left sub-tree. 
// Remember to balance the tree on the way up after removing a node. 
 
    Node<T> * remove_node (const T & inData) 
    { 
        if (this == NULL) 
            return NULL; 
 
        // we found the data we were looking for 
 
        if (inData == data) 
        { 
            // save the children 
 
            Node<T> * tmp = left -> move_down_righthand_side (right); 
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            // by setting the children to NULL, we delete exactly one node. 
 
            left = NULL; 
            right = NULL; 
            delete this; 
 
            // return the reorganized children 
 
            return tmp; 
        } 
 
        if (inData < data) 
            left = left -> remove_node (inData); 
        else 
            right = right -> remove_node (inData); 
        return balance (); 
    } 
 
// Recursively print out all nodes in order (left to right). 
 
    void print_node (std::ostream & co) const 
    { 
        if (this == NULL) 
            return; 
 
        left -> print_node (co); 
 
        co << data << " "; 
 
        right -> print_node (co); 





// move_down_righthand_side is the remove_node helper function: 
// 
// Recursively find the right most child in a sub-tree and put 
// the "rhs" sub-tree there. 
// Re-balance the tree on the way up. 
 
    Node<T> * move_down_righthand_side (Node<T> * rhs) 
    { 
        if (this == NULL) 
            return rhs; 
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        right = right -> move_down_righthand_side (rhs); 
        return balance (); 
    } 
 
// 
// Balancing a tree (or sub-tree) requires the AVL algorithm. 
// 
// If the tree is out of balance left-left, we rotate the node to the right. 
// If the tree is out of balance left-right, we rotate the left child to the 
// left and then rotate the current node right. 
// If the tree is out of balance right-left, we rotate the right child to the 
// right and then rotate the current node left. 
// if the tree is out of balance right-right, we rotate the node to the left. 
// 
 
    Node<T> * balance () 
    { 
        int d = difference_in_height (); 
 
        // only rotate if out of balance 
        if (d < -1 || d > 1) 
        { 
            // too heavy on the right 
            if (d < 0) 
            { 
                // if right child is too heavy on the left, 
                // rotate right child to the right 
                if (right -> difference_in_height () > 0) 
                    right = right -> rotate_right (); 
 
                // rotate current node to the left 
                return rotate_left (); 
            } 
            // too heavy on the left 
            else 
            { 
                // if left child is too heavy on the right, 
                // rotate left child to the left 
                if (left -> difference_in_height () < 0) 
                    left = left -> rotate_left (); 
 
                // rotate current node to the right 
                return rotate_right (); 
            } 
        } 
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        // recompute the height of each node on the way up 
        compute_height (); 
 
        // otherwise, the node is balanced and we simply return it 
        return this; 
    } 
 
// ** balancing helper functions ** 
 
    Node<T> * exchange_left (Node<T> * & r, Node<T> * node) 
    { 
        r = left; 
        left = node -> balance (); 
        return balance (); 
    } 
 
    Node<T> * exchange_right (Node<T> * & l, Node<T> * node) 
    { 
        l = right; 
        right = node -> balance (); 
        return balance (); 
    } 
 
    int difference_in_height () 
    { 
        int left_height = (left != NULL) ? left -> height : 0; 
        int right_height = (right != NULL) ? right -> height : 0; 
        return left_height - right_height; 
    } 
 
    Node<T> * rotate_left () 
    { 
        return right -> exchange_left (right, this); 
    } 
 
    Node<T> * rotate_right () 
    { 
        return left -> exchange_right (left, this); 





// Cover class for maintaining the tree. 
// 
// Since Node<T> is self allocating and self deleting, the Tree<T> class 
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// ensures that only qualified calls are made. 
// 
// Tree<T> is the public interface to the AVL Tree code. 
// Node<T> is not meant to be used by the public. 
// 
// This code makes use of the somewhat dubious practice of calling a member 
// function with a NULL "this" pointer.  We will not run into problems since 
// we have no virtual member functions in Node<T>. 
// 
 









    Tree () 
    { 
        root = NULL; 
    } 
 
    ~Tree () 
    { 
        delete root; 
    } 
 
    void insert (const T & inData) 
    { 
        root = root -> insert_node (inData); 
    } 
 
    T * find (const T & inData) const 
    { 
        Node<T> * found = root -> find_node (inData); 
        if (found != NULL) 
            return & found -> data; 
        else 
            return NULL; 
    } 
 
    void remove (const T & inData) 
    { 
        root = root -> remove_node (inData); 
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    } 
 
    void print (std::ostream & co) const 
    { 
        root -> print_node (co); 





// Declare a useful extention to the output stream convention for 
// the Tree<T> class. 
// 
 
template <class T> 
std::ostream & operator << (std::ostream & co, const Tree<T> & tree) 
{ 
    tree.print (co); 
    return co; 
} 
 




































using namespace std; 
class Kasha { 
public: 
    Kasha(); 
    ~Kasha(); 
 
    static void myCallback(u_char *user,struct pcap_pkthdr *pph, u_char *pdata);  
    void bufferPacket(struct pcap_pkthdr *pph, u_char *pdata); 
private:     
 
    int sendPacketEth2(); 
 
    int sendPacketEth1(); 
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    void sensorInit(); 
     
    float suspectMembershipFunc(); 
 
    float normalMembershipFunc(); 
     
    void forwardPacket(); 
     
     
    char errbuf[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
     
    void processPacket(); 
     
    void analyzeResults(); 
     
    static void * dispatcherStart(void * arg); 
     
    void dispatcherRun(); 
     
    //libnet initializations 
    libnet_t * eth2; 
    libnet_t * eth1; 
     
    //packet info 
    u_char * pdata; 
    struct pcap_pkthdr * pph; 
    struct ether_header * eh; 
    struct my_tcp * tcp; 
    struct my_ip * ip; 
    
    int numSensors; 
    unsigned long numPackets; 
    long int packetsQueued; 
    time_t tempTime; 
     
    pthread_t threadID; 
    pthread_mutex_t * allocMutex; 
 
    Sensor * sensors[1]; 
    int sensorWeight[1]; 
     
    pthread_mutex_t * bufferMutex; 
    pthread_cond_t * bufferCond; 
    list<KashaBufferNode *> buffer; 
    KashaBufferNode * bufferNodePtr; 
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    float normalMembership; 
    float suspectMembership; 
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    pthread_mutex_init(allocMutex, NULL); 
    eth1 = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK_ADV,"eth1",errbuf); 
    eth2 = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK_ADV,"eth2",errbuf); 
    normalMembership = -1; 
    suspectMembership = -1; 
    numPackets = 0; 
    numSensors = 1;//3; 
    packetsQueued = 0; 
    sensors[0] = new KashaWebIsolator(2); 
    sensorWeight[0] = 1; 
    for(int i = 0;i<numSensors;i++) 
        pthread_mutex_lock(sensors[i]->mutex); 
     
    bufferMutex = new pthread_mutex_t; 
    bufferCond = new pthread_cond_t; 
     
    pthread_mutex_init(bufferMutex, NULL); 
    pthread_mutex_init(allocMutex, NULL); 
    pthread_cond_init(bufferCond, NULL); 
    sensors[0]->setAllocMutex(allocMutex); 





    for(int i=0;i<numSensors;i++){ 
      delete sensors[i]; 
    } 
    pthread_mutex_destroy(bufferMutex); 
    pthread_cond_destroy(bufferCond); 
    pthread_mutex_destroy(allocMutex); 
    while(buffer.size() > 0){ 
        buffer.pop_front(); 
    } 
} 
 
void Kasha::myCallback(u_char *user,struct pcap_pkthdr *pph, u_char *pdata){ 
    Kasha *ptr = (Kasha*)user; 




inline void Kasha::processPacket(){ 
for(int i = 0;i<numSensors;i++){ 
        sensors[i]->reset(); 
        pthread_mutex_unlock(sensors[i]->mutex); 
        pthread_cond_broadcast(sensors[i]->cond); 
    } 
    for(int i=0;i<numSensors; ){ 
        pthread_mutex_lock(sensors[i] -> mutex); 
        while(sensors[i] -> normalMembership == -1) 
            pthread_cond_wait(sensors[i]->cond, sensors[i]->mutex); 
        i++; 
         





/*These are the functions used to route the packet once the      */ 
/*the packet has been analyzed and a trust decision has been made*/ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
int Kasha::sendPacketEth2(){ 










float normalThreshold = .5; 
float suspectThreshold = .5; 
    if(normalMembership >= normalThreshold ) 
        status1 = sendPacketEth1(); 
    if(suspectMembership >= suspectThreshold) 
        status2 =  sendPacketEth2(); 
    if(!(normalMembership >= normalThreshold)&& 
       !(suspectMembership >= suspectThreshold)) 
       status2 = sendPacketEth2(); 
} 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*Currently there is no need for any initialization other than   */ 
/*simply declaring the sensors that are to be used but if you    */ 
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/*need to do some sort of initialization this would be a good    */ 





/*These two functions compile all the results from the sensors   */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
float Kasha::suspectMembershipFunc(){ 
    float result = 0; 
    float totalWeight = 0; 
    // cout<<"Suspect Input "; 
    for(int i =0;i<numSensors;i++){ 
        //cout<<sensors[i]->suspectMembership<<" "; 
        if(sensors[i]->suspectMembership != SENSOR_IGNORE){ 
            totalWeight += sensorWeight[i]; 
            result += sensors[i]->suspectMembership * sensorWeight[i]; 
        } 
    } 
   // cout<<endl; 




    float result = 0; 
    float totalWeight; 
    //cout<<"normal input: "; 
    for(int i =0;i<numSensors;i++){ 
       // cout<<sensors[i]->normalMembership<<" "; 
        if(sensors[i]->normalMembership != SENSOR_IGNORE){ 
            totalWeight += sensorWeight[i]; 
            result = result + sensors[i]->normalMembership * sensorWeight[i]; 
        } 
    } 
    //cout<<endl; 




/*This is the function that compiles all the results from the   */ 
/*sensors. When it is finished it will unlock all mutexes.       */ 
/*MUTEXES MUST BE LOCKED BEFORE CALLING THIS FUNCTION!!!!        */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
void Kasha::analyzeResults(){ 
    normalMembership = normalMembershipFunc(); 




//void Kasha::bufferPacket(struct pcap_pkthdr *pph, const u_char *pdata){ 
inline void Kasha::bufferPacket(struct pcap_pkthdr *pph, u_char *pdata){ 
    numPackets++; 
    pthread_mutex_lock(allocMutex); 
    KashaBufferNode* node = new KashaBufferNode(pph,pdata); 
    pthread_mutex_unlock(allocMutex); 
    
    pthread_mutex_lock(bufferMutex); 
    packetsQueued++; 
    buffer.push_back(node); 
    pthread_mutex_unlock(bufferMutex); 
     
    if(packetsQueued == 1) 
    pthread_cond_broadcast(bufferCond); 
     
} 
 
void* Kasha::dispatcherStart(void * arg){ 





inline void Kasha::dispatcherRun(){ 
KashaBufferNode * node; 




    pthread_mutex_lock(bufferMutex); 
    while(buffer.front() == NULL){ 
        pthread_cond_wait(bufferCond,bufferMutex); 
    } 
     
    node = buffer.front(); 
    pthread_mutex_unlock(bufferMutex); 
    while(node!=NULL){ 
    waiting++; 
    cout<<numPackets<<endl; 
 
    Sensor::setPacketData(&node->pktHdrPtr, node->packetPtr, node->arrivalTime); 
    processPacket(); 
    pthread_mutex_lock(bufferMutex); 
    buffer.pop_front(); 
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    packetsQueued--; 
    node = buffer.front(); 
    pthread_mutex_unlock(bufferMutex); 
    } 
     
}//end while 
}//end dispatcher Run 
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APPENDIX D. C++ KASHAADDRNODE.H 
/* 
 *  KashaAddrNode.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 
 *  Created by John Judd on Sat Feb 15 2003. 
 *   
 *TO DO: 
 *implement purge of list 














    KashaAddrNode(u_long inputAddress){ 
        address = inputAddress; 
    } 
     
    ~KashaAddrNode(){ 
         
        while(IPlist.size()>0){ 
            IPlist.pop_front(); 
        } 
    } 
//IP address that is used as the key for the node 
    u_long address; 
     
//overloaded operators 
    bool operator == (const KashaAddrNode & rhs) const{ 
        return address == rhs.address; 
    } 
    bool operator < (const KashaAddrNode & rhs) const{ 
        return address < rhs.address;  
    } 
    bool operator > (const KashaAddrNode & rhs) const{ 
62 
        return address > rhs.address;  
    } 
    bool operator >= (const KashaAddrNode & rhs) const{ 
        return address >= rhs.address;  
    } 
    bool operator <= (const KashaAddrNode & rhs) const{ 
        return address <= rhs.address;  
    } 
   friend ostream& operator<<(ostream & outs, KashaAddrNode & ptr){    
 outs<<libnet_addr2name4(ptr.address, LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)<<" 
"<<ptr.IPlist.size()<<endl; 
        return outs; 
   } 
 
     
 //adds current time to the list of times on this node most  
//current timestamp is added to the end of the list.  
    void addCurrentTimeStamp(time_t &tempTime){ 
        purgeList(-1,tempTime); 
        if(difftime(tempTime, IPlist.front())> 20*60){ 
             IPlist.push_back(tempTime); 
        } 
    } 
     
//removes timestamps that are out of the window 
    bool purgeList(float timeInterval, time_t tempTime){ 
    //if timeInterval passed in is 0 then use 30 days 
        if (timeInterval == -1)  
            timeInterval = (30*24*60*60); 
       while(difftime(tempTime, IPlist.front())> timeInterval  
                && IPlist.size() > 0){ 
            IPlist.pop_front(); 
        } 
        return true; 
    } 
     
    list< time_t > IPlist; 
    list< time_t >::iterator iter; 
 






APPENDIX E. C++ KASHABUFFERNODE.H 
/* 
 *  KashaBufferNode.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 














using namespace std; 
class KashaBufferNode{ 
public: 
    KashaBufferNode(); 
    KashaBufferNode(struct pcap_pkthdr * pph, u_char * data); 
    ~KashaBufferNode(); 
    u_char * packetPtr; 
    time_t arrivalTime; 
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APPENDIX F. C++ KASHABUFFERNODE.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaBufferNode.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 








KashaBufferNode::KashaBufferNode(struct pcap_pkthdr * pph, u_char * data){ 
    memcpy(&pktHdrPtr, pph,sizeof(struct pcap_pkthdr)); 
    packetPtr = new u_char[pktHdrPtr.caplen]; 
    memcpy(packetPtr, data, pktHdrPtr.caplen); 




    if(packetPtr != NULL) 
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APPENDIX G. C++ KASHACONNECTIONNODE.H 
/* 
 *  KashaConnectionNode.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 












using namespace std; 
class KashaConnectionNode{ 
public: 
    KashaConnectionNode(); 
    KashaConnectionNode(int inputAddWindow, int inputLiveWindow); 
    bool purgeList(int,time_t); 
    void addCurrentTimestamp(time_t & tempTime); 
    bool operator == (const KashaConnectionNode & rhs) const;     
    bool operator < (const KashaConnectionNode & rhs) const; 
    friend ostream & operator << (ostream &outs, const KashaConnectionNode & ptr); 
    u_long src; 
    u_long dest; 
    u_int16_t service; 
 
    int size; 
    list< time_t >::iterator iter; 
    list<time_t> timestampList; 
 
private: 
    //seconds before next timestamp can be added to list 
    int timestampAddWindow; 
    //seconds for timestamp to live on list 
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APPENDIX H. C++ KASHACONNECTIONNODE.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaConnectionNode.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 







    src = 0; 
    dest = 0; 
    service = 0; 
    size = 0; 
    //private members 
    timestampAddWindow = 1;//20*60; //20 minutes 
    timestampLiveWindow = 30*24*60*60;//30 days 
} 
 
KashaConnectionNode::KashaConnectionNode(int inputAddWindow, int 
inputLiveWindow){ 
    src = 0; 
    dest = 0; 
    service = 0; 
    size = 0; 
    //private members 
    timestampAddWindow = inputAddWindow; 
    timestampLiveWindow = inputLiveWindow; 
} 
 
bool KashaConnectionNode::operator < (const KashaConnectionNode & rhs) const{ 
    //order IPs for both nodes 
    //comparison is SRC>DEST>SERVICE 
    u_long aBig = src; 
    u_long aSmall; 
    if(aBig < dest){ 
        aBig = dest; 
        aSmall = src; 
    } 
    u_long bBig = rhs.src; 
    u_long bSmall; 
    if(bBig < rhs.dest){ 
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        bBig = rhs.src; 
        bSmall = rhs.src; 
    } 
    if (aBig == bBig){ 
        if (aSmall == bSmall){ 
                return service < rhs.service; 
            } 
        else{ return aSmall < bSmall;} 
    } 
    else{ 
    return aBig < bBig; 
    } 
     
    cout<<"error computing < KashaConnectionNode"; 
    return src < rhs.src;  
    }// end bool < 
 
bool KashaConnectionNode::operator == (const KashaConnectionNode & rhs) const{ 
    return (src == rhs.src && 
    rhs.dest == rhs.dest && 
     service == rhs.service)  
            || 
    (dest == rhs.dest &&  
    dest == rhs.src && 
    service == rhs.service); 
} 
 
ostream & operator << (ostream &outs, const KashaConnectionNode & ptr){ 
    outs<<"Source "<<libnet_addr2name4(ptr.src,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)<< " "<< 
            libnet_addr2name4(ptr.dest,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)<< " " 
            <<" numtimestamps "<<ptr.timestampList.size()<<endl; 
    return outs; 
} 
 
     
//adds a timestamp to the list if it can be added. 
//A time stamp will only be added as long as timstampAddWindow  
//seconds have gone by since the last time stamp was added 
void KashaConnectionNode::addCurrentTimestamp(time_t & tempTime){ 
    //iter = timestampList.begin();  
    purgeList(200000,tempTime); 
    cout<<difftime(tempTime,timestampList.front() )<<endl; 
    if(difftime(tempTime,timestampList.front() )> 10 ||  
    timestampList.size() == 0){ 
        size++; 
        timestampList.push_back(tempTime); 
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    } 
    cout<<"added Timestamp "<<tempTime<<" "<<timestampList.size()<<endl; 
} 
     
//removes timestamps that are out of the window 
bool KashaConnectionNode::purgeList(int purgeInterval,time_t tempTime){ 
    while(difftime(tempTime, timestampList.front())> purgeInterval  
            && timestampList.size() > 0){ 
            timestampList.pop_front(); 
            size--; 
        } 
        return true; 
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APPENDIX I. C++ KASHACONNECTIONSENSOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaConnectionSensor.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 
 *  Created by John Judd on Tue Feb 18 2003. 
 * 
 * Problems: How to check for connection failure 
 * I am thinking watchdog timer. 

















class KashaConnectionSensor: public Sensor{ 
 
public: 
    KashaConnectionSensor(); 
    virtual ~KashaConnectionSensor();     
    //analysis function called by Kasha.cpp    
   
    void buildTempNode(); 
    
    void syncLocalVariables(); 
 
protected: 
    //temporary connection variables 
    u_long srcAddr; 
    u_long destAddr; 
    u_short service; 
    u_short protocol; 
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    int purgeInterval; 
    int timeBetweenListEntries; 
    int listWindowSize; 
 
    long int numPackets; 
    //pointer to data structures 
    struct my_tcp * tcpHeader; 
    struct my_ip * ipHeader; 
    struct ether_header * eh; 
/******tree for storing connections******/ 
    AVL::Tree<KashaConnectionNode> connectionTree; 
     
//temp node used for searching trees     
    KashaConnectionNode temp; 
//pointer to object returned by tree search 
    KashaConnectionNode  * ptr; 
     
     
private: 
    float normalMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode *); 
    float suspectMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode *); 







APPENDIX J. C++ KASHACONNECTIONSENSOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaConnectionSensor.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 






    srcAddr = 0; 
    destAddr = 0; 
    purgeInterval = 30*24*60*60; 
    timeBetweenListEntries = 20*60; 
    listWindowSize = 24*3; 
    service = 0; 
    protocol = 0; 
    normalMembership = 0; 
    suspectMembership = 0; 
    numPackets = 0; 
 








    numPackets++; 
    sensorBail(); 
    return; 
    ipHeader = (struct my_ip *)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header)); 
    protocol = ipHeader->ip_p; 
    if(protocol == TCP){ 
        syncLocalVariables(); 
        buildTempNode(); 
        ptr = NULL; 
        ptr = connectionTree.find(temp); 
        if(ptr != NULL){ 
            ptr->addCurrentTimestamp(tempTime); 
  
            normalMembership = normalMembershipFunc(ptr); 
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            suspectMembership = suspectMembershipFunc(ptr); 
             
        }//end 2nd level if 
        else{ 
        /*because when we build temp node we set the direction 
        *based on the location of the service port in the packet 
        *If we make it to this code it is either a new packet 
        *or it is using a service port for both the source and Destination 
        *port numbers and we will have to handle both of these cases. 
        */ 
            if(tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port > 1024 && tcpHeader-> tcp_dest_port > 1024){ 
                //this would be where we lookup the service in the efemeral table. 
                //if it existed. If match then we add to the connection tree if not 
                //then we assume the packet is bad and should skew the result that way 
                normalMembership = .9; 
                suspectMembership = 1.1; 
                /* 
                output<<"unusual ports! "<<tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port<< " " << 
                tcpHeader-> tcp_dest_port<<endl; 
                */ 
            }//end 3rd level if 
            else{ 
            /*the packet is part of a new connection this is  
            *the only place an add to the tree is done this  
            *should be threaded here since this will be threaded 
            *for now I am just going to add the new temp object. 
            */ 
            //add the time to the node 
            connectionTree.insert(temp); 
            ptr = connectionTree.find(temp); 
            while(ptr == NULL){ 
            connectionTree.insert(temp); 
            ptr = connectionTree.find(temp); 
            } 
            ptr->addCurrentTimestamp(tempTime); 
            //insert the node into the tree 
             
            normalMembership = normalMembershipFunc(ptr); 
            suspectMembership = suspectMembershipFunc(ptr); 
    
            ptr = &temp; 
          
            } 
        }//end 2nd level else 
             
    }//end 1st level if 
77 
    else{ 
    //not a tcp packet 
        normalMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE;//need to do something here 
        suspectMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE;//need to do something here 
        //output<<"non TCP"<<endl; 






    if(htons(tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port) < 1024 || 
        htons(tcpHeader-> tcp_dest_port) < 1024){ 
        
         if(tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port > tcpHeader-> tcp_dest_port){ 
            temp.service = tcpHeader->tcp_dest_port; 
            temp.src = srcAddr; 
            temp.dest = destAddr; 
         }//end second level if 
         else{ 
            temp.service = tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port; 
            temp.src = destAddr; 
            temp.dest = srcAddr; 
         }//end 2nd level else 
    }//end 1st level if 
    else{ 
    /*the service is an efemeral port 
    *We should now check the efemeral service table that  
    *doesn't exist yet! 
    *for now just put in something 
++++THIS IS A PROBLEM HERE!!! FIX ME !!!++++ 
    */ 
        temp.service = tcpHeader -> tcp_src_port; 
        temp.src = destAddr; 
        temp.dest = srcAddr; 





    tcpHeader = (struct my_tcp*)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header) +  
        ((ipHeader->ip_vhl)&htons(0x0f))*4); 
    srcAddr = ipHeader->ip_src.s_addr; 
    destAddr = ipHeader->ip_dest.s_addr; 






KashaConnectionNode * nodePtr){ 
    if(nodePtr == NULL){ 
    cerr<<"bad ptr membership func"<<endl; 
    exit(1); 
    } 
    float size = nodePtr -> timestampList.size(); 
    if(size > 0) 
        if(size/listWindowSize < 1) 
            return size/listWindowSize; 
        else 
            return 1; 
    else 




KashaConnectionNode * nodePtr){ 
    if(nodePtr == NULL){ 
     cerr<<"bad ptr membership func"<<endl; 
     exit(1); 
    } 
     
    float size = nodePtr -> timestampList.size(); 
    if(size > 0) 
        if (listWindowSize/size > 1) 
            return 1; 
        else 
            return listWindowSize/size; 
    else 





APPENDIX K. KASHAHEADERS.H 
/* 
 *   
 *   
 * 
 *  Created by John Judd on Fri Jan 24 2003. 
 *   Thanks to Chris Eagle for the formats and the start of this   







#ifndef LOG  
#define LOG  
#endif 
struct my_ip { 
        u_int8_t        ip_vhl;         /* header length, version */ 
#define IP_V(ip)        (((ip)->ip_vhl & 0xf0) >> 4) 
#define IP_HL(ip)       ((ip)->ip_vhl & 0x0f) 
        u_int8_t        ip_tos;         /* type of service */ 
        u_int16_t       ip_len;         /* total length */ 
        u_int16_t       ip_id;          /* identification */ 
        u_int16_t       ip_off;         /* fragment offset field */ 
 
#define IP_DF 0x4000                     
    /* dont fragment flag */ 
#define IP_MF 0x2000                     
    /* more fragments flag */ 
#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fff                
    /* mask for fragmenting bits */ 
     
#define TCP 6 
#define UDP 17 
     
        u_int8_t        ip_ttl;         /* time to live */ 
        u_int8_t        ip_p;           /* protocol */ 
        u_int16_t       ip_sum;         /* checksum */ 
        struct in_addr ip_src,ip_dest;  /* source and dest address */ 
}; 
 
struct my_tcp { 
        u_int16_t       tcp_src_port; 
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        u_int16_t       tcp_dest_port; 
        u_int32_t       tcp_seq_num; 
        u_int32_t       tcp_ack_num; 
        u_int8_t        tcp_dataOff; 
#define TCP_DATAOFF(tcp)        ((tcp)->tcp_dataOff >> 2) 
        u_int8_t        tcp_flags; 
#define TCP_UF 0x20                     
    /* urgent flag */ 
#define TCP_AF 0x10                    
    /* ack flag */ 
#define TCP_PF 0x08                     
    /* push flag */ 
#define TCP_RF 0x04                     
    /* reset flag */ 
#define TCP_SF 0x02                     
    /* syn flag */ 
#define TCP_FF 0x01                     
    /* fin flag */ 
#define IP_MF 0x2000                     
    /* more fragments flag */ 
         
        u_int16_t       tcp_window; 
        u_int16_t       tcp_checksum; 
        u_int16_t       tcp_urgptr; 
}; 
 
struct my_udp { 
    u_int16_t       udp_src_port; 
    u_int16_t       udp_dest_port; 
    u_int16_t     udp_length; 





  u_char * packetPtr; 
  time_t arrivalTime; 






#define SENSOR_IGNORE -2 
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APPENDIX L. C++ KASHAL3ISOLATOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaIsolator.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 












class KashaL3Isolator: public Sensor{ 
public: 
    KashaL3Isolator(u_short type); 
    bool layer3SyncEH(); 
    bool layer3Sync(); 
    void analyzePacket(); 
    AVL::Tree<KashaIsolatorNode> tree; 
    KashaIsolatorNode tempNode; 
    KashaIsolatorNode * nodePtr; 
 
protected: 
    struct ether_header * eh; 
    struct my_ip * ip; 
    u_int32_t src; 
    u_int32_t dest; 
    u_short etherType; 
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APPENDIX M. C++ KASHAL3ISOLATOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaL3Isolator.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 







    etherType = type; 




inline bool KashaL3Isolator::layer3SyncEH(){ 
    eh = (struct ether_header *)(pdata); 
    if(eh != NULL) 
        return true; 




    /*it would be nice to check for IP version here*/ 
    if (!layer3SyncEH()) 
        return false; 
    if(eh->ether_type != ntohs(etherType)) 
        return false; 
    ip = (struct my_ip *)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header)); 
    if(ip != NULL) 
        return true; 
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APPENDIX N. C++ KASHAL4ISOLATOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaL4Isolator.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 













class KashaL4Isolator: public KashaL3Isolator { 
public: 
    KashaL4Isolator():KashaL3Isolator(ETHERTYPE_IP){} 
    KashaL4Isolator( u_short layer3type, u_int8_t protocolIn, u_int16_t portIn); 
    bool layer4Sync(); 
    void setMask(u_int32_t newMask); 
    void analyzePacket(); 
 
protected: 
    void buildTempNode(); 
    u_int8_t protocol; 
    u_int16_t port; 
    struct my_tcp * tcp; 
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APPENDIX O. C++ KASHAL4ISOLATOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaL4Isolator.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 






KashaL4Isolator::KashaL4Isolator(u_short layer3type, u_int8_t protocolIn, u_int16_t 
portIn) 
    :KashaL3Isolator(layer3type){ 
    protocol = protocolIn; 




void KashaL4Isolator::setMask(u_int32_t newMask){ 
    mask = newMask; 
} 
/*returns true so long as all properties match Layer 2-4*/ 
bool KashaL4Isolator::layer4Sync(){ 
    if(!layer3Sync()) 
        return false; 
    if(ip->ip_p != protocol) 
        return false; 
    tcp = (struct my_tcp *)(pdata +  sizeof(struct ether_header) +  
        ((ip->ip_vhl)&0x0f)*4); 
    if(tcp->tcp_src_port != port && tcp->tcp_dest_port != port) 
        return false; 
    return true; 
} 
 
inline void KashaL4Isolator::buildTempNode(){ 
   if(tcp->tcp_src_port==port){ 
        tempNode.dest = (ip->ip_src.s_addr)&mask; 
        tempNode.src = (ip->ip_dest.s_addr)&mask; 
    } 
      tempNode.src = (ip->ip_src.s_addr)&mask; 





    //sensor is passive 
    //add to counter 




APPENDIX P. C++ SENSOR.H 
/* 
 *  Sensor.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 


























using namespace std; 
class Sensor{ 
public: 
    Sensor();   
     
    virtual ~Sensor(); 
    static void * threadFunc(void * arg); 
     
    static void setPacketData(const struct pcap_pkthdr * hdr,  
                         u_char * pkt, time_t myTime); 
    void run(); 
    virtual void analyzePacket(){} 
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    void reset(); 
     
    void sensorBail(){normalMembership = 1;suspectMembership = 1;} 
    void setAllocMutex(pthread_mutex_t * am){allocMutex = am;} 
    float normalMembership; 
    float suspectMembership; 
    pthread_t threadID; 
    pthread_mutex_t * allocMutex; 
    pthread_mutex_t * mutex; 
    pthread_cond_t * cond; 
    ofstream output; 
protected: 
    static const struct pcap_pkthdr * header; 
    static u_char * pdata; 





APPENDIX Q. C++ SENSOR.CPP 
 
/* 
 *  Sensor.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 









    cond = new pthread_cond_t; 
    mutex = new pthread_mutex_t; 
    pthread_mutex_init(mutex,NULL); 
    pthread_cond_init(cond,NULL); 
    pthread_create(&threadID,NULL,threadFunc,(void*)this); 








void * Sensor::threadFunc(void * arg){ 
    Sensor * ptr = (Sensor *)arg; 
    ptr->run(); 
    return NULL; 
} 
 
void Sensor::setPacketData(const struct pcap_pkthdr * hdr,  
                 u_char * pkt,time_t myTime){ 
    header = hdr; 
    pdata = pkt; 





    normalMembership = SENSOR_RESET; 
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    suspectMembership = SENSOR_RESET; 
} 
void Sensor::run(){ 
    while(true){ 
    pthread_mutex_lock(mutex); 
        while(normalMembership != SENSOR_RESET) 
            pthread_cond_wait(cond, mutex); 
    analyzePacket(); 
    pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex); 
    pthread_cond_broadcast(cond); 




const struct pcap_pkthdr * Sensor::header; 




APPENDIX R. C++ KASHASRCSENSOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaSrcSensor.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 




















using namespace std; 
/* 
*To DO: 
*1. implement a tree wide purge on a set interval 
*2. get/set for purgeInterval 
*3. get/set for listWindowSize 
*4. overloaded constructor 
*/ 
class KashaSrcSensor : public Sensor { 
public: 
    KashaSrcSensor(); 
    ~KashaSrcSensor(); 
// analysis function called by Kasha.cpp 
    void analyzePacket(); 
 





    void setLastPurge(); 
    void extractIP(); 
 
//Membership Functions 
    float suspectMembershipFunc( KashaAddrNode *); 
    float normalMembershipFunc( KashaAddrNode *); 
     
//AVL tree that stores all IP addresses     
    AVL::Tree<KashaAddrNode> tree; 
     
// IP address that is used to search tree 
    u_long IP; 
 
//time stamp that is set when a purge of list is run 
    time_t lastPurge; 
     
//sliding window for purging timestamps contained in nodes 
    float purgeInterval; 
 
//size of list window for a trusted connection 
//72 by default, a connections seen every 20 minutes for a day.     
    int listWindowSize; 
     
    long int numPackets; 






APPENDIX S. C++ KASHASRCSENSOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaSrcSensor.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 







//pass in 0 so that we get the default 30 days 
    purgeInterval = 0; 
//set listWindowSize to default of 72 or a connection 
//seen every 20 minutes for a day 
    listWindowSize = 72; 
    numPackets = 0; 
   output.open("srcSensorLog.txt",ios::out); 






float KashaSrcSensor::suspectMembershipFunc( KashaAddrNode * node){ 
    //what to do if not seen often, how to calculate 
    //72 is 24 * 3; so a connection seen every 20 minutes for a day 
    float size = node->IPlist.size(); 
     
    if(size > 0) 
        if (listWindowSize/size > 1) 
            return 1; 
        else 
            return listWindowSize/size; 
    else 
    return 1.5; 
} 
 
float KashaSrcSensor::normalMembershipFunc( KashaAddrNode * node){ 
    //what to do if seen often 
    float size = node->IPlist.size(); 
    if(size > 0) 
        if(size/listWindowSize < 1) 
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            return size/listWindowSize; 
        else 
            return 1; 
    else 
    return .1;  
} 
 
void KashaSrcSensor::setPurgeInterval(float interval){ 






    numPackets++; 
    sensorBail(); 
     
    output<<numPackets<<endl; 
   // return; 
    extractIP(); 
    KashaAddrNode temp(IP); 
    KashaAddrNode * ptr; 
    ptr = tree.find(temp); 
    if(ptr != NULL){ 
        //IP has been seen before and is in the tree 
         
        ptr->addCurrentTimeStamp(tempTime); 
        
         
output<<tempTime<<"Update|"<< 
libnet_addr2name4(IP,  LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE); 
output<<" | listLength: "<<ptr->IPlist.size()<<endl; 
     } 
    else{ 
    //First sighting of this IP 
        temp.addCurrentTimeStamp(tempTime); 
        tree.insert(temp); 
        ptr = tree.find(temp); 
    } 
    //update return location; 
    normalMembership = normalMembershipFunc(ptr); 




     struct my_ip * ip = (struct my_ip *)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header)); 
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APPENDIX T. C++ KASHAWEBISOLATOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaWebIsolator.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 










class KashaWebIsolator:public KashaL4Isolator{ 
public: 
 
    KashaWebIsolator(u_int16_t numInterfaces); 
     
    /*called by sensor base class. main analysis function*/ 
    void analyzePacket(); 
 
    /*Builds the temp node to search the (L-3)tree for*/ 
    void buildTempNode(); 
 
    /*Writes data from node to a file named according 
        to the IP addresses in the current Isolator node 
        */ 
    void writeToFile(); 
 
    /*Writes packet to wire depending on the bins in the current 
        isolator node that is being pointed at.*/ 
    void writeToWire(); 
     
    /*useed for libnet error messages*/ 
    char errbuf[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
     
    /*used for file name when writing data to file*/ 
    char charPtr[37]; 
 
    /*character pointers used to get string representation of the 
        IP addresses used in the file name*/ 
    u_char * s1; 
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    u_char * s2; 
 
private: 
    /*libnet instances for packet injection*/ 
    //libnet_t * * interfaceArray; 
    libnet_t * fast; 
    libnet_t * slow; 
 
    /*Threshlod value*/ 
    u_int32_t threshold; 




APPENDIX U. C++ KASHAWEBISLOATOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaWebIsolator.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 






numInterfaces):KashaL4Isolator(ETHERTYPE_IP, TCP, 80){ 
  mask = 0xffffffff;   
  slow = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK_ADV,"en1",errbuf); 
  fast = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK_ADV,"en2",errbuf); 
  threshold = 100; 
  nodeCount = 0; 
  nodeLastBin = 0; 
} 
 
inline void KashaWebIsolator::buildTempNode(){ 
   if(tcp->tcp_src_port==port){ 
        tempNode.dest = (ip->ip_src.s_addr)&mask; 
        tempNode.src = (ip->ip_dest.s_addr)&mask; 
        return; 
    } 
      tempNode.src = (ip->ip_src.s_addr)&mask; 
      tempNode.dest = (ip->ip_dest.s_addr)&mask; 
} 
 
inline void KashaWebIsolator::analyzePacket(){ 
    normalMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE; 
    suspectMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE; 
    return; 
    if(!layer4Sync()){ 
        //cout<<"-"; 
        //cout<<"----"<<header->len<< " "<<header->caplen<<endl; 
        return; 
        } 
   // cout<<endl; 
    //cout<<"webIsolatorMatch"<<endl; 
    buildTempNode(); 
    nodePtr = NULL; 
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    nodePtr = tree.find(tempNode); 
    if(nodePtr == NULL){ 
        //must add a new node 
        cout<<"fail lookup"<<endl; 
        //char c; 
        //cin >> c; 
        while(nodePtr == NULL){ 
            tree.insert(tempNode); 
            nodePtr = tree.find(tempNode); 
        } 
    }//end if 
    //found existing node 
    nodePtr->touchNode(tempTime); 
    nodeCount = nodePtr->timeBin[nodePtr->currentBin]; 
    nodeLastBin = nodePtr->lastBin; 
    //if(nodePtr->listSize > 1) 
    //    writeToFile(); 




based on current node writes all unwritten data in node to file 
 Status: complete 
 */ 
inline void KashaWebIsolator::writeToFile(){ 
    s1 = libnet_addr2name4(nodePtr->src,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE); 
    int ct=0; 
    for(int i =0;s1[i] != NULL; i++){ 
        ct++; 
    } 
    s2 = libnet_addr2name4(nodePtr->dest,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE); 
    for(int i =0;s2[i] != NULL; i++){ 
        ct++; 
    } 
    int ct2 =0; 
    for(int i =0;s1[i] != NULL; i++){ 
        charPtr[i] = s1[i]; 
        ct2++; 
    } 
    charPtr[ct2] = '-'; 
    ct2++; 
    charPtr[ct2] = '>'; 
    ct2++; 
    for(int i =0;s2[i] != NULL; i++){ 
        charPtr[ct2] = s2[i]; 
        ct2++; 
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    } 
    charPtr[ct2] = '.'; 
    ct2++; 
    charPtr[ct2] = 'x'; 
    ct2++; 
    charPtr[ct2] = 'l'; 
    ct2++; 
    charPtr[ct2] = 's'; 
    ct2++; 
    charPtr[ct2] = NULL; 
 //   pthread_mutex_lock(allocMutex); 
    ofstream tempOutput; 
    tempOutput.open(charPtr,ios::app); 
     
//    pthread_mutex_unlock(allocMutex); 
     
    int temp = 0; 
    while(nodePtr->listSize > 0){ 
        temp = nodePtr->binList.front(); 
        nodePtr->binList.pop_front(); 
        //cout<<"adding "<<temp<<" "<<charPtr<<endl; 
        tempOutput<<temp<<","; 
        nodePtr->listSize--; 
    } 
    tempOutput.close(); 
} 
 
/*Writes the current packet to the wire sending to either 
interface 1 or 2 based on the current information in the isolator node 
being pointed at. 
*/ 
inline void KashaWebIsolator::writeToWire(){ 
    int code = -1; 
    if(nodeCount < threshold && nodeLastBin < threshold && nodeLastBin != 0){ 
       // cout<<"<<->>"<<charPtr<<" C: "<<nodeCount<<" B: "<< 
//nodePtr->numBinsProcessed<< 
       // " T: "<<difftime(tempTime, nodePtr->timeStart)<<" LB: "<<nodeLastBin<<endl; 
        //if(header->len > 1500) 
            //code =libnet_adv_write_link(slow, pdata, 1500); 
        //else 
            //code = libnet_adv_write_link(slow, pdata, header->len); 
        //if(code <0){ 
         //   cout<<code<<" "<<libnet_geterror(slow)<<errbuf<<endl; 
         //   cout<<header->len<<" "<<header->caplen<<endl; 
         //   cout<<ip->ip_len<<endl; 
       // } 
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    } 
    else 
    { 
        //cout<<"+"; 
        //cout<<"++++"<<charPtr<<" C: "<<nodePtr->timeBin[nodePtr->currentBin] 
//<<" B: "<<nodePtr->numBinsProcessed<< 
        //" T: "<<difftime(tempTime, nodePtr->timeStart)<<" L: "<<header->len<<endl; 
 
        //if(header->len > 1500) 
           // code = libnet_adv_write_link(fast, pdata, 1500); 
       // else 
          //  code = libnet_adv_write_link(fast, pdata, header->len); 
 
        //if(code <0){ 
          //  cout<<code<<" "<<libnet_geterror(fast)<<errbuf<<endl; 
          //  cout<<header->len<<" "<<header->caplen<<endl; 
          //  cout<<ip->ip_len<<endl; 
        //} 




APPENDIX V. C++ KASHAUDPSENSOR.H 
/* 
 *  KashaUDPSensor.h 
 *  Kasha 
 * 

















class KashaUDPSensor: public Sensor{ 
public: 
    KashaUDPSensor(); 
    virtual ~KashaUDPSensor(); 
    void analyzePacket(); 
private: 
    void buildTempNode(); 
    void logNewPacket(); 
    void logUpdate(); 
    float normalMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode *); 
    float suspectMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode *); 
    //temporary connection variables 
    u_long srcAddr; 
    u_long destAddr; 
    short protocol; 
    KashaConnectionNode temp; 
    KashaConnectionNode * ptr; 
     
    //pointer to data structures 
    struct my_udp * udpHeader; 
    struct my_ip * ipHeader; 
     
108 
    int timeBetweenListEntries; 
    int purgeInterval; 
    long int numPackets; 
    int listWindowSize; 







APPENDIX W. C++ KASHAUDPSENSOR.CPP 
/* 
 *  KashaUDPSensor.cpp 
 *  Kasha 
 * 




KashaUDPSensor::KashaUDPSensor (): Sensor(){ 
    timeBetweenListEntries = 20*60; 
    purgeInterval = 30*24*60*60; 
    numPackets = 0; 
    listWindowSize = 72; 







    numPackets++; 
    sensorBail(); 
    return; 
    ipHeader = (struct my_ip *)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header)); 
    srcAddr = ipHeader->ip_src.s_addr; 
    destAddr = ipHeader->ip_dest.s_addr; 
    protocol = ipHeader->ip_p; 
    ptr = NULL;  
    if(protocol == UDP){ 
        udpHeader = (struct my_udp *)(pdata + sizeof(struct ether_header) + 
((ipHeader->ip_vhl)&ntohs(0x0f))*4); 
        buildTempNode(); 
        ptr = tree.find(temp); 
        if(ptr != NULL){ 
            ptr->addCurrentTimestamp(tempTime); 
            logUpdate(); 
        } 
        else{ 
        temp.addCurrentTimestamp(tempTime); 
        tree.insert(temp); 
        ptr = &temp; 
        logNewPacket(); 
        } 
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        normalMembership = normalMembershipFunc(ptr); 
        suspectMembership = suspectMembershipFunc(ptr); 
    } 
    else{ 
    /* 
    #ifdef LOG 
    output <<tempTime<< " Non UDP Packet "<<endl; 
    #endif 
    */ 
    normalMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE; 
    suspectMembership = SENSOR_IGNORE; 




    u_int16_t srcPort, destPort; 
    srcPort = udpHeader -> udp_src_port; 
    destPort = udpHeader-> udp_dest_port;  
    if(srcPort < 1024 || destPort < 1024){ 
         if(srcPort > destPort){ 
            temp.service = destPort; 
            temp.src = srcAddr; 
            temp.dest = destAddr; 
         }//end second level if 
         else{ 
            temp.service = srcPort; 
            temp.src = destAddr; 
            temp.dest = srcAddr; 
         }//end 2nd level else 
    }//end 1st level if 
    else{ 
    /*the service is an efemeral port 
    *We should now check the efemeral service table that  
    *doesn't exist yet! 
    *for now just put in something 
++++THIS IS A PROBLEM HERE!!! FIX ME !!!++++ 
    */ 
   // cout<<"greate than 1024! "<<endl; 
        temp.service = udpHeader -> udp_src_port; 
        temp.src = destAddr; 
        temp.dest = srcAddr; 




float KashaUDPSensor::normalMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode * nodePtr){ 
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    float size = nodePtr->timestampList.size(); 
    if(size > 0) 
        if(size/listWindowSize < 1) 
            return size/listWindowSize; 
        else 
            return 1; 
    else 
    return .1;  
} 
 
float KashaUDPSensor::suspectMembershipFunc(KashaConnectionNode * nodePtr){ 
    float size = nodePtr->timestampList.size(); 
    if(size > 0) 
        if (listWindowSize/size > 1) 
            return 1; 
        else 
            return listWindowSize/size; 
    else 









    return; 
    #ifdef LOG 
    output<<tempTime<<" UDP updated "<< 
libnet_addr2name4(ptr->src,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE<< 
 " "<<libnet_addr2name4(ptr->dest,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)<< 
 " "<<" #timestamps “ <<ptr->timestampList.size()<<endl; 
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void catch_int(int sig_num); 
int main (int argc,  char ** argv[]) { 
    char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
    pcap_t* descr; 
    char *dev; 
    Kasha pcapObj; 
    signal(SIGINT,catch_int); 
    dev = pcap_lookupdev(errbuf); 
    /*Look up the device to capture on*/ 
    dev = "en0"; 
    descr = pcap_open_live(dev,BUFSIZ, -1,10,errbuf); 
    /*Open a capture session*/ 
    pcap_loop(descr, -1, (pcap_handler)Kasha::myCallback, (u_char*)&pcapObj); 
    /*register our call back function*/ 
    return 0; 
} 
void catch_int(int sig_num){ 
    //set signal mask here or race condition may occur 
    /******THIS IS NOT DONE YET*****/ 
    cout<<"caught stop signal"<<endl; 
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APPENDIX Y. C++ MAKEFILE 
all:Kasha.h Kasha.cpp Sensor.h Sensor.cpp KashaStats.cpp KashaStats.h 
KashaSensor.cpp KashaSrcSensor.cpp KashaSrcSensor.h KashaConnectionSensor.h 
KashaConnectionSensor.cpp avltree.h KashaConnectionNode.h 
KashaTCPServiceIsolator.cpp KashaTCPServiceIsolator.h KashaConnectionNode.cpp 
KashaUDPSensor.h KashaUDPSensor.cpp 
 g++ -o KashaMake Kasha.cpp Sensor.cpp KashaStats.cpp 
KashaSrcSensor.cpp KashaConnectionSensor.cpp main.cpp KashaConnectionNode.cpp 
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APPENDIX Z. OBJ-C BUFFERNODE.H  
// 
//  BufferNode.h 
//  tranquility 
// 








@interface BufferNode : NSObject { 
@public 
    //captured Packet from pcap 
    NSMutableData * data; 
     
    //time of arrival 
    time_t arrivalTime; 
     
    //pcap packet header 
    struct pcap_pkthdr pktHdr; 
 
    //Variable used for replay in injection engine 
    int interface; 
} 
-(id)initWithPacket:(const u_char *)packetIn  
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APPENDIX AA. OBJ-C BUFFERNODE.M  
// 
//  BufferNode.m 
//  tranquility 
// 








-(id)initWithPacket:(const u_char *)packetIn 
          andPktHdr:(struct pcap_pkthdr *)pktHdrIn{ 
     
    [super init]; 
     
    //copy pcap packet header 
    memcpy(&pktHdr, pktHdrIn,sizeof(struct pcap_pkthdr)); 
     
    //initialize packet mem space 
    data = [[NSMutableData alloc]initWithBytes:packetIn length:pktHdr.caplen]; 
 
    //set arrival time 
    time(&arrivalTime); 
 
    interface = 0; 
    return self; 






    return [self initWithPacket:[node->data bytes] 
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APPENDIX BB. OBJ-C CONTROLLER.H  






@interface Controller : NSObject 
{ 
    IBOutlet id binSize; 
    IBOutlet id fastTrafficDestination; 
    IBOutlet id model; 
    IBOutlet id numberOfBins; 
    IBOutlet NSTextField *packetsBuffered; 
    IBOutlet id packetsCaptured; 
    IBOutlet id packetsProcessed; 
    IBOutlet id portField; 
    IBOutlet id protocol; 
    IBOutlet id slowTrafficDestination; 
    IBOutlet id splitterStatus; 
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    float binSizeInput = [binSize floatValue]; 
    NSString * fast = [[NSString alloc]  
initWithString:[fastTrafficDestination stringValue]]; 
    NSString * slow = [[NSString alloc]  
initWithString:[slowTrafficDestination stringValue]]; 
    unsigned long numBins = [numberOfBins intValue]; 
    unsigned int proto = [protocol intValue]; 
    unsigned int thresh = [threshold intValue]; 
    unsigned int port = [portField intValue]; 
    [[model dispatcher] addSensor:[[L4Isolator alloc] initWithL4Type:proto 
                                                 andInjectionBuffer:[model injectionBuffer] 
                                                      andBufferLock:[model injectionBufferLock] 
                                                        andFastDest:fast 
                                                        andSlowDest:slow 
                                                         andBinSize:binSizeInput 
                                                    andNumberOfBins:numBins 
                                                   andFastThreshold:thresh 
                                                   andSlowThreshold:thresh 





    NSString * string = [model startSplitter]; 





    NSString * string = [model stopSplitter]; 
















    [packetsProcessed setIntValue:[model getNumberOfPacketsProcessed]]; 
} 
- (IBAction)Reset:(id)sender{ 
    [[model captureEngine] numberOfPacketsCaptured:0]; 
    NSMutableArray * ap = [model captureBuffer]; 
    NSConditionLock * al = [model captureBufferLock]; 
    [al lock]; 
    [ap removeAllObjects]; 
    [al unlockWithCondition:NODATA]; 
    [packetsCaptured setIntValue:0]; 





APPENDIX DD. OBJ-C MODEL.H  








@interface Model : NSObject 
{ 
@public 
    CaptureEngine * captureEngine; 
    InjectionEngine * injectionEngine; 
    Dispatcher * dispatcher; 
     
    NSMutableArray * captureBuffer; 
    NSMutableArray * injectionBuffer; 
 
    L4Isolator * sensor; 
    //this is the lock that is given to both 
    //the dispatcher and the capture engine 
    NSConditionLock * captureBufferLock; 
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    //initialize the buffer lock 
    captureBufferLock =[[NSConditionLock alloc] initWithCondition:NODATA]; 
    injectionBufferLock = [[NSConditionLock alloc]initWithCondition:NODATA]; 
 
    //initialize buffer for captured packets 
    captureBuffer= [[NSMutableArray alloc] init]; 
 
    //initialze injectionBuffer 
    injectionBuffer = [[NSMutableArray alloc] init]; 
 
    //initialize the capture engine 
    captureEngine = [[CaptureEngine alloc] initWithBuffer:captureBuffer 
                                                  andLock:captureBufferLock]; 
 
    //initialize injection engine 
    injectionEngine = [[InjectionEngine alloc]initWithBuffer:injectionBuffer 
                                            andInjectionLock:injectionBufferLock]; 
    //initialize dispatch engine 
    dispatcher = [[Dispatcher alloc] initWithBuffer:captureBuffer 
                                            andLock:captureBufferLock]; 
     
    //launch the stub thread to ensure isMultiThreaded is set 
    [NSThread detachNewThreadSelector:@selector(stub) toTarget:self withObject:Nil]; 
 
    //launch capture thread 
    [captureEngine start]; 
    [injectionEngine start]; 
 
    [dispatcher start]; 




    [captureEngine startCapture]; 




    [captureEngine stopCapture]; 
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    NSAutoreleasePool * localPool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init]; 
    if([NSThread isMultiThreaded]) 
        NSLog(@"entering Multithreaded Mode"); 




    [captureEngine release]; 
    [captureBuffer release]; 
    [injectionBuffer release]; 
    [captureBufferLock release]; 
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APPENDIX FF. OBJ-C INJECTIONENGINE.H  
// 
//  InjectionEngine.h 
//  tranquility 
// 
//  Created by John Judd on Thu May 01 2003. 








@interface InjectionEngine : NSObject { 
@public 
    NSMutableArray * buffer; 
    NSConditionLock * bufferLock; 
 
    libnet_t * injector; 
    libnet_t * injector1; 
     
    //for libnet error messages 
    char errbuf[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
    char errbuf1[LIBNET_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
 
    //needed to recover data structures for injection 
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APPENDIX GG. OBJ-C INJECTIONENGINE.M 
// 
//  InjectionEngine.m 
//  tranquility 
// 
//  Created by John Judd on Thu May 01 2003. 







    injector = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK,"en1",errbuf); 
    injector1 = libnet_init(LIBNET_LINK,"en2",errbuf1); 
    if(injector == NULL){ 
        NSLog(@"error initializing libnet"); 
        printf(errbuf); 
    } 
    if(injector1 == NULL){ 
        NSLog(@"error initializing libnet"); 
        printf(errbuf); 
    } 




   andInjectionLock:(NSConditionLock *)lockInput{ 
    [super init]; 
    buffer = bufferInput; 
    bufferLock = lockInput; 








    [bufferLock lock]; 
    [buffer addObject:nodeIn]; 
    NSLog(@"inj buffer size: %d" ,[buffer count]); 
    [bufferLock unlockWithCondition:HASDATA]; 




    eh = (struct ether_header *)[node->data bytes]; 
    int i; 
    //build the frame for injection using libnet 
    i = libnet_build_ethernet( 
        (u_char *)eh->ether_dhost, /*Destination MAC*/ 
        (u_char *)eh->ether_shost, /*Source MAC*/ 
        eh->ether_type,            /*Layer-2 Type*/ 
        (u_char *)([node->data bytes]+sizeof(struct ether_header)),/*Layer-3 Data pointer*/ 
        node->pktHdr.caplen-sizeof(struct ether_header)-4, /*size of data*/ 
        injector,     /*Libnet descriptor*/ 
        0);      /*optional ptag_t*/ 
    if(i< 1){ 
        printf(libnet_geterror(injector)); 
        return NO; 
    } 
    //inject the frame using libnet                           
    i = libnet_write(injector); 
    if(i< 1){ 
        printf(libnet_geterror(injector)); 
        return NO; 
    } 
    //NSLog(@"inject: %d ",i); 
 
    //clear libnet memory this is important or the new data 
    //will be appended to the old data and result in 
    //a frame too large to send 
    libnet_clear_packet(injector); 




    eh = (struct ether_header *)[node->data bytes]; 
    int i; 
    //build the frame for injection using libnet 
    i = libnet_build_ethernet( 
        (u_char *)eh->ether_dhost, /*Destination MAC*/ 
        (u_char *)eh->ether_shost, /*Source MAC*/ 
        eh->ether_type,            /*Layer-2 Type*/ 
        (u_char *)([node->data bytes]+sizeof(struct ether_header)),/*Layer-3 Data pointer*/ 
        node->pktHdr.caplen-sizeof(struct ether_header)-4, /*size of data*/ 
        injector1,     /*Libnet descriptor*/ 
        0);      /*optional ptag_t*/ 
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        if(i< 1){ 
            printf(libnet_geterror(injector1)); 
            return NO; 
        } 
        //inject the frame using libnet 
        i = libnet_write(injector1); 
        if(i< 1){ 
            printf(libnet_geterror(injector1)); 
            return NO; 
        } 
// 
       // NSLog(@"inject1: %d ",i); 
        //clear libnet memory this is important or the new data 
        //will be appended to the old data and result in 
        //a frame too large to send 
        libnet_clear_packet(injector1); 




    [NSThread detachNewThreadSelector:@selector(run) 
                             toTarget:self withObject:nil]; 




    NSAutoreleasePool * localPool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init]; 
    double count = 0; 
    BufferNode * node; 
     
    while(1){ 
        //NSLog(@"running"); 
        [bufferLock lockWhenCondition:HASDATA]; 
        if(count == 0){ 
            count = [buffer count]; 
        } 
        if(count > 0){ 
            node = [buffer objectAtIndex:0]; 
            if(node->interface == 0) 
                [self inject:node]; 
            else 
                [self inject1:node]; 
            [buffer removeObjectAtIndex:0]; 
            count--; 
        } 
        if(count == 0) 
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            [bufferLock unlockWithCondition:NODATA]; 
        else 
            [bufferLock unlockWithCondition:HASDATA]; 
         
         
    } 






APPENDIX HH. OBJ-C CAPTUREENGINE.H 
// 
//  CaptureEngine.h 
//  tranquility 
// 
//  Created by John Judd  







//for pcap capture library 
#import <pcap.h> 
//for HASDATA and NODATA 
#import "kashaHeaders.h" 
@interface CaptureEngine : NSObject  
{ 
@public 
    //buffer for captured packets along with lock 
    NSMutableArray * buffer; 
    NSConditionLock * captureBufferLock; 
     
    //error buffer for pcap 
    char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
     
    //pcap descriptor 
    pcap_t* descr; 
     
    //name of interface to sniff on 
    char *dev; 
     
    //struct for use with pcap_pkthdr info 
    struct pcap_pkthdr pkthdr; 
         
    //boolean for starting and stopping capture 
    BOOL capture; 
 
    //total number of packets captured 
    unsigned long numberPacketsCaptured; 
 
    //number of packets in buffer 
















APPENDIX II. OBJ-C CAPTUREENGINE.M  
// 
//  CaptureEngine.m 
//  tranquility 
// 
//  Created by John Judd  








Callback function used for packet capture 
*/ 
void pcapCallback(u_char *user,struct pcap_pkthdr *pph,const u_char *pdata){ 
    CaptureEngine * ce = (CaptureEngine*)user; 
    if(ce->capture == NO)return; 
    BufferNode * node = [[BufferNode alloc] initWithPacket:pdata andPktHdr:pph]; 
    //start mutex region 
    [ce->captureBufferLock lock]; 
    [ce->buffer addObject:node]; 
    //NSLog(@"%d", [ce->buffer count]); 
    [ce->captureBufferLock unlockWithCondition:HASDATA]; 
    ce->numberPacketsCaptured++; 







    NSLog(@"testfunc called"); 








    //device to capture traffic on 
    dev = pcap_lookupdev(errbuf); 
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    //initialize the pcap descriptor 
    descr = pcap_open_live(dev,BUFSIZ, -1,10,errbuf); 
     
    //ensure pcap initialized correctly 
    if(descr == NULL){ 
        NSLog(@"pcap initialization Error"); 
        NSString * string =[[NSString alloc] 
            initWithCString:pcap_geterr(descr)]; 
        NSLog(string); 
    } 
     
    capture = NO; 
 
    numberPacketsCaptured = 0; 
    currentBufferSize = 0; 




            andLock:(NSConditionLock *) lock{ 
    captureBufferLock = lock; 
    buffer = packetBuffer; 
    [packetBuffer retain]; 




    [NSThread detachNewThreadSelector:@selector(run) 
                             toTarget:self 




    NSAutoreleasePool * localPool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init]; 
    if([NSThread isMultiThreaded]) 
        NSLog(@"entering Multithreaded Mode"); 
    NSLog(@"capture thread running"); 
    while(1){ 
        pcap_loop(descr, -1, (pcap_handler)pcapCallback, (u_char*)self); 
    } 





















    [captureBufferLock lock]; 
    currentBufferSize = [buffer count]; 
    [captureBufferLock unlock]; 
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APPENDIX JJ. OBJ-C DISPATCHER.H 
// 
//  Dispatcher.h 
//  tranquility 
// 







//for HASDATA and NODATA 
#import "kashaheaders.h"  
@interface Dispatcher : NSObject { 
    //buffer to read buffer nodes from 
    NSMutableArray * buffer; 
 
    //lock for reading buffer 
    NSConditionLock * bufferLock; 
 
    //array for storing sensors 
    NSMutableArray * sensorArray; 
 
    //lock used internally when adding sensors 
    NSLock * sensorArrayLock; 
 
    //number of packets processed 
    unsigned long numberOfPacketsProcessed; 
   } 
-(id)init; 
-(id)initWithBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)packetBuffer 
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APPENDIX KK. OBJ-C DISPATCHER.M  
// 
//  Dipatcher.m 
//  tranquility 
// 








    sensorArray = [[NSMutableArray alloc] init]; 
    sensorArrayLock = [[NSLock alloc]init]; 
    numberOfPacketsProcessed = 0; 
    return self; 
} 
-(id)initWithBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)packetBuffer 
            andLock:(NSConditionLock *)lock{ 
    buffer = packetBuffer; 
    bufferLock = lock; 




    [buffer release]; 




    [sensorArray addObject:sensor]; 




    [NSThread detachNewThreadSelector:@selector(dispatcherRun) 




    NSAutoreleasePool * localPool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init]; 
    int i; 
    int bufferCount = 1; 
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    L4Isolator * sensor; 
    BufferNode * node; 
    //take control of sensors 
    for(i = 0 ; i < [sensorArray count] ; i++){ 
        sensor = [sensorArray objectAtIndex:i]; 
        [sensor->lock lockWhenCondition:OLDDATA]; 
    } 
     
    while(1){ 
        [bufferLock lockWhenCondition:HASDATA]; 
 
        //get first packet in buffer 
        node = [buffer objectAtIndex:0]; 
        [node retain]; 
        [buffer removeObjectAtIndex:0]; 
        bufferCount--; 
        numberOfPacketsProcessed++; 
        if(bufferCount <= 0) 
            bufferCount = [buffer count]; 
        if(bufferCount == 0) 
            [bufferLock unlockWithCondition:NODATA]; 
        else 
            [bufferLock unlock]; 
         
        /*This lock puts a control around the march of the sensors 
            a new sensor can be added so long as this lock is unlocked*/ 
        [sensorArrayLock lock]; 
         
        //update and signal sensors 
        for(i = 0 ; i < [sensorArray count] ; i++){ 
            sensor = [sensorArray objectAtIndex:i]; 
            [sensor newNode:node]; 
            [sensor->lock unlockWithCondition:NEWDATA]; 
        } 
        /*see the following for information on how to lock the threads together 
            http://cocoadevcentral.com/articles/000061.php 
        */ 
        for(i = 0 ; i < [sensorArray count] ; i++){ 
            sensor = [sensorArray objectAtIndex:i]; 
            [sensor->lock lockWhenCondition:OLDDATA]; 
        } 
        // process any information from sensors 
 
        [sensorArrayLock unlock]; 
        [node release]; 
                
147 
    }//end while 
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APPENDIX LL. OBJ-C L4ISOLATOR.H  
// 
//  L4Isolator.h 
//  tranquility 
// 










@interface L4Isolator : NSObject { 
    //injectionBufer 
    NSMutableArray * injectionBuffer; 
    NSConditionLock * injectionBufferLock; 
 
    //layer-3 type 
    u_short layer3Type; 
 
    //layer-4 type 
    u_int8_t layer4Type; 
 
    //data overlays for packet 
    struct ether_header * eh; 
    struct my_ip * ip; 
 
    //dictionary for all connections 
    NSMutableDictionary * connections; 
 
    //configuration for isolator nodes 
    unsigned long numberOfBins; 
    unsigned long binInterval; 
 
    //Variables for rate analysis 
    int currentCount; 
    int highThreshold; 
    int lowThreshold; 
    int fastInterface; 
    int slowInterface; 
    NSMutableData * fastMAC; 
150 
    NSMutableData * slowMAC; 
    unsigned int port; 
     
    @public 
        BufferNode * node; 





 andInjectionBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)array 
      andBufferLock:(NSConditionLock *)bufferLock; 
 
-(id)initWithL4Type:(u_int8_t)l4Type 
 andInjectionBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)array 
      andBufferLock:(NSConditionLock *)bufferLock 
          andFastDest:(NSString *)fast 
        andSlowDest:(NSString *)slow 
         andBinSize:(unsigned long)binSizeIn 
    andNumberOfBins:(unsigned long)numberOfBinsIn 
   andFastThreshold:(int)thresholdHigh 
   andSlowThreshold:(int)thresholdLow 
            andPort:(unsigned int)portIn; 

















APPENDIX MM. OBJ-C L4ISOLATOR.M  
// 
//L4Isolator.m 
//  tranquility 
// 








    lock = [[NSConditionLock alloc] initWithCondition:OLDDATA]; 
    connections = [[NSMutableDictionary alloc]init]; 
    numberOfBins = 10; 
    binInterval = 10; 
    highThreshold = 0; 
    lowThreshold = 50; 
    fastInterface = 0; 
    slowInterface = 1; 
    fastMAC = [[NSMutableData alloc]init]; 
    slowMAC = [[NSMutableData alloc]init]; 
    port = 0; 
    return self; 
} 
-(id)initWithL4Type:(u_int8_t)l4Type 
 andInjectionBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)array 
     andBufferLock:(NSConditionLock *)bufferLock{ 
    injectionBuffer = array; 
    injectionBufferLock = bufferLock; 
    layer4Type = l4Type; 
     




 andInjectionBuffer:(NSMutableArray *)array 
      andBufferLock:(NSConditionLock *)bufferLock 
        andFastDest:(NSString *)fast 
        andSlowDest:(NSString *)slow 
         andBinSize:(unsigned long)binSizeIn 
    andNumberOfBins:(unsigned long)numberOfBinsIn 
   andFastThreshold:(int)thresholdHigh 
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   andSlowThreshold:(int)thresholdLow 
            andPort:(unsigned int)portIn{ 
 
    //[super init]; 
    lock = [[NSConditionLock alloc] initWithCondition:OLDDATA]; 
    connections = [[NSMutableDictionary alloc]init]; 
    layer4Type = l4Type; 
    injectionBuffer = array; 
    injectionBufferLock = bufferLock; 
    unsigned int fast_length = [fast length]; 
    unsigned int slow_length = [slow length]; 
    unsigned int * fastLength = &fast_length; 
    unsigned int * slowLength = &slow_length; 
    fastMAC = [[NSMutableData alloc]initWithBytes: 
         libnet_hex_aton((u_char *)[fast cString],fastLength) length:*fastLength]; 
    slowMAC = [[NSMutableData alloc]initWithBytes: 
         libnet_hex_aton((u_char *)[slow cString],slowLength) length:*slowLength];     
    binInterval = binSizeIn; 
    numberOfBins = numberOfBinsIn; 
    highThreshold = thresholdHigh; 
    lowThreshold = thresholdLow; 
    port = portIn; 







//    [newNode retain]; 
//    [node release]; 




//when this is called node holds a new node to be analyzed 
     
    //check for Layer-3 type 
    eh = (struct ether_header *)[node->data bytes]; 
    if(eh->ether_type != ETHERTYPE_IP) 
        return; //we only work with IP for now sorry :-( 
 
    //check for Layer-4 type 
    ip = (struct my_ip *)([node->data bytes] + sizeof(struct ether_header)); 
    if(ip->ip_p != layer4Type) 
        return; 
153 
    if(layer4Type == UDP) 
        [self analyzeUDP]; 
    else 




    NSAutoreleasePool * localPool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init]; 
    NSLog(@"L4 Sensor started %d", port); 
    while (1){ 
        [lock lockWhenCondition:NEWDATA]; 
        [self newPacket]; 
        [lock unlockWithCondition:OLDDATA]; 
    } 





    [NSThread detachNewThreadSelector:@selector(run) 








    BOOL correctDirection; 
    struct my_tcp * tcp = (struct my_tcp *)([node->data bytes] + 
                                            sizeof(struct ether_header)+ 
                                            ((ip->ip_vhl)&0x0f)*4); 
 
   if(tcp->tcp_src_port != port && 
      tcp->tcp_dest_port!= port && 
      port != 0){ //zero can be used to look at all tcp traffic 
        return; 
   } 
    //determine direction of connection 
    if(tcp->tcp_src_port < 1024) 
        correctDirection = YES; 
    else 
        correctDirection = NO; 
     
    //make a string of source + destination 
    NSString * source = [[NSString alloc]initWithCString: 
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        libnet_addr2name4(ip->ip_src.s_addr,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)]; 
 
    NSString * dest = [[NSString alloc]initWithCString: 
        libnet_addr2name4(ip->ip_dest.s_addr,LIBNET_DONT_RESOLVE)]; 
 
    NSString * key; 
    if(correctDirection == YES){ 
        source = [source stringByAppendingString:@"->"]; 
        key = [source stringByAppendingString:dest]; 
        [source release]; 
    } 
    else{ 
        dest = [dest stringByAppendingString:@"->"]; 
        key = [dest stringByAppendingString:source]; 
        [dest release]; 
    } 
 
    //search dictionary for node 
    IsolatorNode * isolatorNode = [connections objectForKey:key]; 
     
    //if not in dictionary make a temp dictionary and add to primary dictionary 
    if(isolatorNode == nil){ 
        NSLog(@"new node"); 
        isolatorNode = [[IsolatorNode alloc] initWithSource:ip->ip_src.s_addr 
                                                 andDestination:ip->ip_dest.s_addr 
                                                andNumberOfBins:numberOfBins 
                                                 andBinInterval:binInterval]; 
        [isolatorNode touch:node->arrivalTime]; 
        NSDictionary * dict =[NSDictionary dictionaryWithObject:isolatorNode 
                                      forKey:key]; 
        [connections addEntriesFromDictionary:dict]; 
        currentCount = 0; 
    } 
    else{ 
    //if in dictionary touch node. 
        [isolatorNode touch:node->arrivalTime]; 
        currentCount = isolatorNode->currentCount; 
        if(isolatorNode->lastBin > currentCount) 
            currentCount = isolatorNode->lastBin; 
        //NSLog(@"%s count: %d",[key cString],isolatorNode->currentCount); 
    } 
    [self route]; 





    BufferNode * newNode = [[BufferNode alloc] initWithBufferNodePtr:node]; 
    [injectionBufferLock lock]; 
    eh = (struct ether_header *)[newNode->data bytes]; 
    if(currentCount > lowThreshold){ 
        newNode->interface = fastInterface; 
        memcpy(&eh->ether_dhost, [fastMAC bytes], [fastMAC length]); 
    } 
    else{ 
        newNode->interface = fastInterface; 
        memcpy(eh->ether_dhost, [slowMAC bytes], [slowMAC length]); 
 
    } 
    [injectionBuffer addObject:newNode]; 
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APPENDIX NN. OBJ-C ISOLATORNODE.H  
// 
//  IsolatorNode.h 
//  tranquility 
// 






@interface IsolatorNode : NSObject { 
    /* 
     Source and Destination address as a 32 bit 
     representation of a dotted decimal may be 
     a class of network or an individual IP 
     by changing the subnet mask in the isolator 
     */ 
    unsigned long src;  //32 bit source address 
    unsigned long dest; //32 bit destination address 
 
    /*number of bins to use*/ 
    unsigned long numBins; //32 bit number of bins 
    NSMutableArray * timeBinArray; 
 
    /*TIme interval for each bin*/ 
    unsigned long timeBinInterval; 
 
    /*current value*/ 
    unsigned long currentBin; 
 
    /*start time of current bin*/ 
    time_t timeStart; 
 
    /*end time of current bin*/ 
    time_t timeEnd; 
 
    /*number of bins remaining to be written to file*/ 
    unsigned long listSize; 
 
    /*Number of bins processed*/ 




    /*count for current bin*/ 
    unsigned long currentCount; 
 
    /*List of bins*/ 
    NSMutableArray * binArray; 
 
    /*value of last non zero bin*/ 





     andDestination:(unsigned long)destination 
    andNumberOfBins:(unsigned long)numberOfBins 





APPENDIX OO. OBJ-C ISOLATORNODE.M 
// 
//  IsolatorNode.m 
//  tranquility 
// 








    if(src == Nil){ 
        src = 0; 
        dest = 0; 
        numBins = 10; 
        timeBinInterval = 30; 
    } 
    timeBinArray =  [[NSMutableArray alloc]init]; 
    currentBin = 0; 
    timeStart = NULL; 
    timeEnd = timeStart + timeBinInterval; 
    numBinsProcessed = 0; 
    binArray = [[NSMutableArray alloc]init]; 
    currentCount = 0; 
    return self; 
} 
-(id)initWithSource:(unsigned long)source 
     andDestination:(unsigned long)destination 
    andNumberOfBins:(unsigned long)numberOfBins 
     andBinInterval:(unsigned long)interval{ 
    src = source; 
    dest = destination; 
    numBins = numberOfBins; 
    timeBinInterval = interval; 




    if(timeStart == NULL){ 
        timeStart = timestamp; 
        lastBin = 0; 
    } 
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    if(difftime(timestamp, timeStart) <= timeBinInterval){ 
        currentCount++; 
        return; 
    } 
    else{ 
        while(difftime(timestamp, timeStart)>timeBinInterval){ 
            [binArray addObject:[[NSNumber alloc] initWithUnsignedLong:currentCount]]; 
            numBinsProcessed++; 
            if(currentCount != 0){ 
                lastBin = currentCount; 
            } 
            currentCount = 0; 
            currentBin = (numBinsProcessed)%numBins; 
            timeStart= timeStart + timeBinInterval; 
        } 
        currentCount++; 
    } 
    return; 





APPENDIX PP. CAPTURE RESULTS 
Packets 
Injected:  
1237119     
Bytes Injected: 321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Kasha (C++)      
5.01 711396 525723 42.49575021 2524 490.2 
10.03 711563 525556 42.4822511 5058 244.6 
15.05 711813 525306 42.46204286 7588 163 
20.16 545108 692011 55.93730272 10163 121.7 
25.1 442326 794793 64.24547679 12653 97.8 
30.12 381819 855300 69.13643716 5187 81.46 
35.1 327177 909942 73.55331217 17695 69.91 
40.4 281530 955589 77.24309464 20365 60.75 
45.29 248384 988735 79.92238418 22831 54.19 
50.24 228118 1009001 81.56054511 25328 48.84 
55.48 213298 1023821 82.75848968 27967 44.23 
61.05 197681 1039438 84.02085814 30790 40.18 
65.39 170393 1066726 86.22662816 32970 37.52 
71.15 162715 1074404 86.84726368 35875 34.48 




1237119     
Bytes Injected:  321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Tranquility (Obj-C)     
5.01 1235113 2006 0.162150933 2524 490.2 
10.03 1230763 6356 0.513774342 5058 244.6 
15.05 1203644 33475 2.705883589 7588 163 
20.16 1184538 52581 4.250278267 10163 121.7 
25.1 1142743 94376 7.628692147 12653 97.8 
30.12 1087780 149339 12.07151454 15187 81.46 
35.1 1019600 217519 17.58270627 17695 69.91 
40.39 972276 264843 21.40804563 20365 60.75 
45.28 853840 383279 30.98157898 22831 54.19 
50.24 823341 413778 33.44690365 25328 48.84 
55.47 761430 475689 38.45135351 27967 44.23 
61.1 698723 538396 43.5201464 30790 40.18 
65.4 635225 601894 48.65287818 32970 37.52 
71.154 608454 628665 50.81685755 35875 34.48 






1237119     
Bytes Injected:  321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Snort 1.9  -I      
5 1237129 -10 -0.00080833 2524 490.2 
10.03 1236919 200 0.016166594 5058 244.6 
15.05 1229982 7137 0.57690489 7588 163 
20.16 1205649 31470 2.543813489 10163 121.7 
25.1 1168826 68293 5.520325854 12653 97.8 
30.12 1120709 116410 9.409765754 15187 81.46 
35.1 1079037 158082 12.77823718 17695 69.91 
40.39 1032616 204503 16.53058437 20365 60.75 
45.28 994764 242355 19.59027385 22831 54.19 
50.25 954577 282542 22.83870832 25328 48.84 
55.48 923868 313251 25.32100792 27967 44.23 
61.1 900041 337078 27.24701504 30790 40.18 
65.39 872856 364263 29.44445926 32970 37.52 
71.16 851271 385848 31.18923887 35875 34.48 




1237119     
Bytes Injected:  321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Snort 1.9 No Console Output -ci     
5 1237123 -4 -0.000323332 2524 490.2 
10.03 1236802 317 0.025624051 5058 244.6 
15.05 1227793 9326 0.753848256 7588 163 
20.16 1203300 33819 2.73369013 10163 121.7 
25.1 1160748 76371 6.173294566 12653 97.8 
30.12 1110990 126129 10.19538137 15187 81.46 
35.1 1066682 170437 13.77692849 17695 69.91 
40.39 1024366 212753 17.19745635 20365 60.75 
45.28 988199 248920 20.1294229 22831 54.19 
50.25 953397 283722 22.93409122 25328 48.84 
55.48 918929 318190 25.72024195 27967 44.23 
61.1 886486 350633 28.34270592 30790 40.18 
65.39 863850 373269 30.17244097 32970 37.52 
71.16 847200 389919 31.51830988 35875 34.48 





1237119     
Bytes Injected: 321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Snort 1.9 tcpdump logging -bci     
5 1237127 -8 -0.000646664 2524 490.2 
10.03 1236918 201 0.016247426 5058 244.6 
15.05 1227600 9519 0.769449018 7588 163 
20.16 1203076 34043 2.751796715 10163 121.7 
25.1 1164426 72693 5.875990911 12653 97.8 
30.12 1116998 120121 9.709736897 15187 81.46 
35.1 1069109 168010 13.58074688 17695 69.91 
40.39 1025093 212026 17.13869078 20365 60.75 
45.28 990391 246728 19.94375642 22831 54.19 
50.25 953658 283461 22.91299382 25328 48.84 
55.48 925929 311190 25.15441118 27967 44.23 
61.1 891623 345496 27.92746696 30790 40.18 
65.39 873789 363330 29.36904211 32970 37.52 
71.16 845407 391712 31.66324339 35875 34.48 
75.4 841508 395611 31.97841113 38018 32.54 
 
Packets Injected: 1237119     
Bytes Injected:  321607620     
Injection Speed Packets Captured Packets Missed %Missed Packets/sec Seconds 
Mb/s      
Snort 2.0 -ci      
5 1237123 -4 -0.000323332 2524 490.2 
10.03 1236824 295 0.023845725 5058 244.6 
15.05 1205291 31828 2.572751692 7588 163 
20.16 1203528 33591 2.715260213 10163 121.7 
25.1 1165556 71563 5.784649658 12653 97.8 
30.12 1123894 113225 9.152312752 15187 81.46 
35.1 1070066 167053 13.50338973 17695 69.91 
40.39 1030748 206371 16.68158035 20365 60.75 
45.28 991255 245864 19.87391674 22831 54.19 
50.25 958324 278795 22.53582719 25328 48.84 
55.48 923057 314062 25.38656346 27967 44.23 
61.1 892361 344758 27.86781223 30790 40.18 
65.39 868645 368474 29.78484689 32970 37.52 
71.16 847626 389493 31.48387504 35875 34.48 






All capture results were taken on the following machine: 
Macintosh Dual 1.42 Ghz G4 
2Gb RAM 
OS X 10.2.6 
 
Traffic was generated using: 
tcpreplay 1.0.1 
Dell Dimension L667r 667Mhz 
512Mb RAM 
Red Hat 7.3 
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